What are the consequences of a militarized counterterrorism policy? How can the U.S. help build peace? Kenya provides examples both of a failed military-first approach and the alternatives.
In March, I traveled to Kenya to meet with Quaker peacebuilders and other colleagues. FCNL has been working with Friends in Kenya for the last five years as we advocate for U.S. policies that support peacebuilding and rely less on military force. I also met with U.S.-funded organizations that provide economic and educational opportunities for young leaders in the border region between Somalia and Kenya.
I heard that Kenyans appreciate U.S. assistance that supports local peacebuilders and provides training and jobs for their communities. But the U.S. has also provided more than $230 million in militarized security assistance to Kenya during the last decade, about $123 million of which has gone to counterterrorism and border security efforts. U.S. funds, for example, helped train Kenyan police units later accused of brutal violence against civilians. My sense is that this assistance, however well meaning, often ends up exacerbating tensions and does more harm than good.
What’s more, U.S. security assistance to Kenya could soon increase. Much of the nearly $700 million in counterterrorism assistance that President Obama has requested for East Africa would go to Kenya. Secretary of State John Kerry said in May that U.S. security assistance to Kenya could top $100 million this year. In contrast, President Obama is asking for only $30 million for the entire Complex Crises Fund to support violence prevention projects and groups around the world.
The U.S. is spending too much money on militarized assistance and not nearly enough on peacebuilding. Two recent attacks have shaken Kenya’s sense of security — one at Westgate mall in 2013 and another at Garissa University this year. To the Kenyans I spoke with, these massacres are warning signs that the larger problems Kenyans face have not been adequately addressed — problems that U.S. security assistance cannot solve. Yet the U.S. responded to the mall attack by stepping up assistance to Kenya’s anti-terrorism police.
I was told that some people, especially Muslims, will not go to the police with information because they fear the police more than they fear al-Shabab.
Local communities need to be protected from groups like al-Shabab, who claimed responsibility for those attacks. But the Kenyan police unit that received increased U.S. aid has a history of abuse and violence, as the U.S. State Department and Human Rights Watch have documented. I was told that some people, especially Muslims, will not go to the police with information because they fear the police more than they fear al-Shabab.
Systemic corruption exacerbates local grievances, leading some people to trust armed groups rather than the government. This, in turn, increases recruitment for those groups. More U.S. military and police aid will not help.
In some cases, the U.S. has played a positive role. In 2007, election-related violence left more than 1,000 people dead and spurred efforts to prevent a recurrence. In advance of the 2013 national elections, FCNL encouraged U.S. support for Kenyan peacebuilders who were monitoring potential flash points in their communities. Both the Obama administration and Congress spoke supportively about violence prevention efforts. This focus contributed to relatively peaceful elections.
Kenyan national elections will take place again in 2017. Kenyan Quakers tell us that what happens before these elections will have a big impact on whether and how much violence occurs during the elections. President Obama’s visit to Kenya in July provides an opportunity for the U.S. to shift its course to support peacebuilding more than problematic police and military forces. U.S. policy needs to sustain its support for Kenyan efforts to build peace.
In Kenya, I met with people who are reactivating systems used during the last elections and coordinating to be able to respond to problems. They strongly believe that building sustained peace and security is a long-term process. Their everyday experiences reinforce a conviction that deadly military action and abusive police crackdowns are part of the problem.
The U.S. should support these efforts by increasing support for community-based programs to address trauma, root out corruption, support democratic governance and provide sustainable development assistance. This, not militarized security, should be the U.S. focus.
The peacebuilders I met in Kenya are showing us what success looks like. We should pay attention.
