For more than sixteen months, Sudan has been embroiled in a devastating conflict. The U.S. has invited the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for a new round of ceasefire talks, with outside parties including the U.N., African Union, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE as observers. However, as of Monday August 19th,the SAF have refused to send a delegation.
Plagued by a lack of political representation and disagreements over natural resources, past processes have failed to generate true reconciliation.
For over half a century, peace processes and agreements have followed on-and-off conflict in Sudan. Plagued by a lack of political representation and disagreements over natural resources, past processes have failed to generate true reconciliation. For example, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan in 2005, aimed to end decades of violence in Sudan through complex power-sharing structures and started the process which bifurcated the country into Sudan and South Sudan. It was successful in tackling one major barrier to peace but failed to build lasting security. This begs the question: what does a reconciliation process need to break the pattern of violence and create sustainable peace in Sudan?
1. Bring more voices to the table
Talks sponsored by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have resulted in at least 16 failed ceasefires since April 2023 and civilians and civil society organizations have not been included in new diplomatic efforts. A new peace deal for Sudan cannot be led by the elites and the military. Past efforts to reconcile warring parties, such as in 2005 and again in 2019, focused too heavily on the elites’ division of natural resources, revenue, and military interests. Both the 2005 and 2019 agreements failed to sufficiently include civil society actors, women, youth, and a diverse group of religious leaders.
President Omar al-Bashir controlled Sudan over a 30-year autocratic reign marked by the repression of civil liberties and mass violence against ethnic minorities including genocide in Darfur. Efforts from local civic groups between 2013 and 2018 led directly to the civilian movement that ousted President al-Bashir in 2019 with the hope of establishing democracy in the country. Any new peace process must learn from this movement, which relied on associations of tea sellers, community organizers and others from all around the country.
The U.S. must ensure facilitators and mediators are working for long-term peace for the Sudanese people and ensure them a seat at the table.
2. Provide historical & future justice
Past peace processes have not adequately dealt with failed deals, and atrocities committed by former regimes and warring parties. Implementation of peace plans were slow and external parties failed to support their success. Civilians felt unheard, creating grievances that could lead to future violence.
When a ceasefire does take hold in territories that have known prolonged violence, the state must regain the trust of ordinary people, and end predatory wartime practices.
When a ceasefire does take hold in territories that have known prolonged violence, the state must regain the trust of ordinary people, and end predatory wartime practices. For peace to take root, justice must be broader than traditional legal definitions. That may look like providing compensation for destroyed property, rebuilding of local institutions marred by corruption and war, or helping create and maintain memorial sites.
In Sudan, parties should consider the establishment of a hybrid court system to provide transitional justice, similar to the UN’s International Tribunal for Rwanda. The international community must ensure justice goes beyond the courthouse and address the root of grievances.
3. Include the entire country
Successive regimes in Sudan have concentrated power in Khartoum, the capital, leaving the peripheral states to fend for themselves and furthering division. This was exacerbated not only due to lack of full inclusion, but also because attention and resources were directed away from marginal areas, eventually triggering new violence.
A new peace process must make efforts to not only include diverse representation from across the entire country, but also guarantee that the results of the agreement bring the equitable economic and social benefits to all regions.
Peace efforts succeed when they draw on local expertise and are representative. A peace process in Sudan needs to consider the failures of earlier attempts. Future peace must include everyone, not just a few powerful actors.
