Some of the specific savings mentioned were:

You can read the entire SANE Act here to find out more ways in which the nuclear arsenal can be cut safely and smartly. Introduced just last month, it already has 39 cosponsors. See the list here.

The Cold War has been over for more than twenty years. It is time to rethink and re-evaluate the nuclear weapons budget. The United States is set to spend more than $600 billion over the next decade on nuclear weapons and related spending. In this time of fiscal constraint and changing threats, it is insane to spend billions of dollars on weapons systems that are unnecessary. The United States currently has thousands of nuclear weapons deployed and in storage. Many of them are on constant high-alert, ready to launch at any moment’s notice. The insanity needs to end.

You can read FCNL’s factsheet on the SANE Act when it was introduced in the last Congress here.

Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons
by Seventy Four Nations
April 24, 2013

This statement was delivered by South Africa on behalf of 74 countries at the Non-Proliferation Treaty PrepCom in Geneva, Switzerland.

I am taking the floor on behalf of the following States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), namely Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte D'Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, Singapore, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia and my own country South Africa.

Our countries are deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. While this has been known since nuclear weapons were first developed and is reflected in various UN resolutions and multilateral instruments, it has not been at the core of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation deliberations for many years. Although it constitutes the raison d’être of the NPT, which cautions against the "devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples", this issue has consistently been ignored in the discourse on nuclear weapons.

Yet, past experience from the use and testing of nuclear weapons has amply demonstrated the unacceptable harm caused by the immense, uncontrollable destructive capability and indiscriminate nature of these weapons. The effects of a nuclear weapon detonation are not constrained by national borders - it is therefore an issue of deep concern to all. Beyond the immediate death and destruction caused by a detonation, socio-economic development will be impeded, the environment will be destroyed, and future generations will be robbed of their health, food, water and other vital resources.

In recent years, the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has increasingly been recognised as a fundamental and global concern that must be at the core of all deliberations on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. This issue is now firmly established on the global agenda: The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT expressed “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons”. Similarly, the 2011 resolution of the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement emphasised the incalculable human suffering associated with any use of nuclear weapons, and the implications for international humanitarian law.

The March 2013 Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons held in Oslo presented a platform to engage in a fact-based discussion on the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation. The broad participation at the Conference reflects the recognition that the catastrophic effects of a detonation are of concern and relevance to all. A key message from experts and international organisations is that no State or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation or provide adequate assistance to victims. We warmly welcome Mexico’s announcement of a follow-up Conference to further broaden and deepen understanding of this matter and the resolve of the international community to address the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

It is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances. The catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed. All efforts must be exerted to eliminate this threat. The only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons will never be used again is through their total elimination. It is a shared responsibility of all States to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent their vertical and horizontal proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament, including through fulfilling the objectives of the NPT and achieving its universality. The full implementation of the 2010 Action Plan and previous outcomes aimed at achieving the objectives of the NPT must therefore not be postponed any further.

Addressing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons is an absolute necessity. As an element that underpins the NPT, it is essential that the humanitarian consequences inform our work and actions during the current Review Cycle and beyond.

This is an issue that affects not only governments, but each and every citizen of our interconnected world. By raising awareness about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, civil society has a crucial role to play, side-by-side with governments, as we fulfil our responsibilities. We owe it to future generations to work together to rid our world of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

I thank you.

This report is particularly timely as the United States and other nuclear nations begin expensive modernization programs to replace old weapons and build new ones:

Along with the high cost of nuclear weapons, the report recognizes that the current security policies in the region are left over from the Cold War era, and must be changed to better reflect the modern world’s threats and challenges. It is especially important for this region of the world, as it contains four out of the five declared nuclear weapons states (China being the only nuclear weapons state not included in this report); and also contains 95% of the global nuclear inventories.

Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region lists specific recommendations to increase trust and build mutual security:

The report acknowledges that new developments and the national security of all the nations must be taken into consider, but dialogue and reciprocal, mutual steps between the United States and Russia are crucial to making progress on nuclear reductions. As the nations with the two largest arsenals, confidence-building measures and increased transparency will eventually lead other nuclear nations to enter future disarmament talks.

Completely eliminating all nuclear weapons is a goal that will take many years to achieve. Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region offers verifiable, concrete steps over the course of the next 15 years to help restart the dialogue on these weapons that endanger us all.

Building Mutual Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region has four co-chairs:
Des Browne, former Secretary of Defence of the United Kingdom
Wolfgang Ischinger, former German Deputy Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Sam Nunn, former U.S. senator from Georgia

The full report can be found here.
A summary can be found here.
A list of all participants can be found here.

Gen. Eugene Habiger

Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command

“We’re on a very clear glide path to get down to lower and lower levels of nuclear weapons. One of my frustrations is, the Cold War’s been over for 20 years, and we still have a significantly large number of nuclear weapons out there. Do we need that many? Probably not…. 600 nuclear weapons in our arsenal should be enough to do what we need to do to deter nuclear weapons.”

Tucker Green, “Exclusive Interview with Eugene Habiger, 4-Star General and Former Head of US Strategic Command,” Georgia Political Review, October 7, 2011.

Wikipedia

Gen. James Cartwright

Former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

“General [James] Cartwright said that the United States’ nuclear deterrence could be guaranteed with a total arsenal of 900 warheads, and with only half of them deployed at any one time…. ‘The world has changed, but the current arsenal carries the baggage of the cold war,’ General Cartwright said in an interview. ‘There is the baggage of significant numbers in reserve. There is the baggage of a nuclear stockpile beyond our needs. What is it we’re really trying to deter? Our current arsenal does not address the threats of the 21st century.’”

Thom Shanker, “Former Commander of U.S. Nuclear Forces Calls for Large Cut in Warheads,” New York Times, May 15, 2012.

commons.wikimedia.org

Gen. Norton Schwartz

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

“We have more backup systems in terms of weapons systems than we actually have deployed. Some of that is a reasonable hedge [but] there is probably room for reductions.”

Bryan Bender, “US General Asks Cut in Nuclear Stockpile,” Boston Globe, August 6, 2012.

American Security Project

Lt. Gen. Dirk Jameson

Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command

". . . The rapidly changing world, aging nuclear systems, and pressing budget issues make this the right time to update our nuclear strategy for the 21st century . . . Today, our nuclear strategy still bears the imprint of the Cold War. The nuclear triad retains our same Cold War arsenal, but reduced in size. It is still far beyond the level that rational military strategists find necessary or practical . . . Nuclear doctrine is not sacred. Our security environment is different now, and our force structure must be responsive to that environment."

Lt. Gen. Dirk Jameson, "We can cut some spending on nuclear strategy," Stars and Stripes, December 14, 2012.

Wikipedia

Gen. John Sheehan

Former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, NATO

"These weapons have increased global uncertainty and it is time for the global community to work toward a regime that eliminates their existence and possible use."

Gen. John Sheehan, Global Zero

commons.wikimedia.org

Gen. Colin Powell

Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Former Secretary of State

"Today I can declare my hope and declare it from the bottom of my heart that we will eventually see the time when that number of nuclear weapons is down to zero and the world is a much better place."

Gen. Colin Powell, 1993 Harvard University Commencement Address, June 10, 1993.

American Security Project

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard

Former Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

“With the end of the cold war, the world has changed, and those who ardently defend massive spending on nuclear weapons are either unaware of, or unwilling to consider, the changed strategic landscape . . . Every submarine in our fleet today can single-handedly destroy every major city in either China or Russia and completely obliterate smaller nations. If the essence of deterrence is a credible threat, then it’s safe to say we can make significant reductions with no impact whatsoever on our deterrent or security capacity."

Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, "Reason over relics: Restructuring our nuclear force," The Hill, February 22, 2012.

worldservicecorps.us

Maj. Gen. Paul Monroe

Former Adjutant General, California National Guard

"In an era in which our most serious threats are terrorism, weapons proliferation and cyberattack, it would be irresponsible not to evaluate whether maintaining a large nuclear arsenal is relevant to addressing those threats . . . We must evaluate the relative value of committing billions of dollars to Cold War nuclear weapons programs against the needs of equipping and training our troops for 21st-century threats . . . It is in our nation’s interest to take a hard look at the nuclear force we really need"

Maj. Gen. Paul Monroe, "The case for considering arms cuts," Politico, February 26, 2012.

Wikipedia

Gen. Anthony Zinni

Former Commander in Chief, United States Central Command

"It is important to bring international pressure to try and reduce weapons of mass destruction — in cases of super power nuclear weapons — to eliminate them, to provide incentives for eliminating them, maybe disincentives for possessing them."

Ian Seeley, "Off the Cuff: Anthony C. Zinni, Retired Four-Star General, Author," Oberlin Review, March 11, 2011.

Rachel Kent, FCNL
Revised March 21, 2013.

Every American president since the end of World War II has sought to come to grips with the unique security risks and challenges associated with nuclear weapons. The specter of a nuclear war, accident, proliferation or terrorism has led to serious and sustained efforts to control, reduce and eliminate nuclear risks. Over the decades, progress has been made in reducing nuclear weapons, and bringing about international agreements on nonproliferation.

Recently, the four of us have supported two major policy initiatives: the 2010 New Start Treaty with Russia, which verifiably reduced bilateral nuclear stockpiles; and the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 and 2012, which have energized global efforts to secure nuclear weapons and materials. Both initiatives are significant and hopeful steps that add to a solid foundation of bipartisan accomplishment over many decades. Most notably, the number of nuclear weapons in the world today is less than one-third of the total in 1986 at the time of the Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik summit.

Despite these considerable efforts, nuclear dangers remain all too real. Technological progress and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states are compounded by dangerous complacency. Bilateral relations between the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, are frayed, and there are continuing difficulties in effectively addressing emerging nuclear threats in North Korea and Iran, punctuated recently by a test explosion in North Korea. Combined with the dangers of suicidal terrorist groups, the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks.

It is far from certain that today's world can successfully replicate the Cold War Soviet-American deterrence by "mutually assured destruction"—the threat of imposing unacceptable damage on the adversary. That was based essentially on a bipolar world. But when a large and growing number of nuclear adversaries confront multiple perceived threats, the relative restraint of the Cold War will be difficult to sustain. The risk that deterrence will fail and that nuclear weapons will be used increases dramatically.

Global leaders owe it to their publics to reduce, and eventually to eliminate, these risks. Even during the Cold War, the leaders of the two superpowers sought to reduce the risk of nuclear war. What was possible among declared enemies is imperative in a world of increasing nuclear stockpiles in some nations, multiple nuclear military powers and growing diffusion of nuclear energy. A global effort is needed to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent their spread, and ultimately end them as a threat to the world. It will take leadership, creative approaches and thoughtful understanding of the perils of inaction. Near-term results would lay the foundation for transforming global security policies over the medium and long term. We suggest four areas requiring urgent consideration:

1. Securing nuclear materials to prevent catastrophic nuclear terrorism. Materials necessary for building a nuclear bomb today are stored at hundreds of sites in 28 countries—down from over 40 countries just 10 years ago. But many of these sites aren't well secured, leaving the materials vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market. Important commitments were undertaken to secure nuclear materials and improve cooperation during the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits. These could improve security for generations to come. Yet no global system is in place for tracking, accounting for, managing and securing all weapons-usable nuclear materials.

At the next Nuclear Security Summit, planned for 2014 in the Netherlands, world leaders should commit to develop a comprehensive global materials security system—including procedures for international assurances—to ensure that all weapons-usable nuclear materials are secure from unauthorized access and theft.

2. Changes in the deployment patterns of the two largest nuclear powers to increase decision time for leaders. In the 2008 campaign, then-Sen. Obama said: "Keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment's notice is a dangerous relic of the Cold War. Such policies increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation. I will work with Russia to end such outdated Cold War policies in a mutual and verifiable way." The U.S. should work with nuclear-armed nations world-wide to remove all nuclear weapons from the prompt-launch status in which nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are deployed to be launched in minutes. To jump-start this initiative, the U.S. and Russia should agree to take a percentage of their nuclear warheads off prompt-launch status—remembering Ronald Reagan's admonition to "trust but verify."

3. Actions following New Start. The progress in the strategic field has been considerable. Washington should carefully examine going below New Start levels of warheads and launchers, including the possibility of coordinated mutual actions. Such a course has the following prerequisites:

a) strict reciprocity; b) demonstrable verification; and c) providing adequate and stable funding for the long-term investments required to maintain high confidence in our nuclear arsenal.

Consolidating and reducing U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons not covered under New Start should also be a high priority. It must be recognized that as some other nuclear-armed states are building up their inventories, or if new nuclear powers emerge, U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions face an inherent limit. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pose a direct threat to regional and global stability. Unless these two states are brought into compliance with their international obligations, their continued nuclear programs will erode support for nonproliferation and further nuclear reductions.

4. Without verification and transparency, nuclear-security agreements cannot be completed with confidence. The U.S. should launch a "verification initiative" that involves the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories and global scientific experts in developing essential technologies and innovations for reducing and controlling nuclear weapons and materials. The principle of enhanced transparency could also be applied to missile defense so long as it doesn't risk capabilities. Taking the lead in fostering greater transparency sets an important base line for all nations and can facilitate future verification of nuclear materials and weapons.

This strategy focused on immediate steps would give leaders greater confidence to take measures to improve security in the near-term. It would boost prospects for support by legislatures. Close consultations with Congress are crucial.

We also need a new dialogue. In our January 2007 op-ed on these pages, we identified practical steps toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These steps will involve many nations, not just those currently in possession of nuclear weapons. Progress will require greater cooperation. The U.S. must work with other key states to establish a joint enterprise with common objectives to achieve near-term results. Russia and the U.S., with the largest nuclear stockpiles, have a special responsibility in this regard.

• A coalition of the willing. The Nuclear Security Summits could provide a model for leaders working together to create a joint enterprise that would generate a coalition of willing states to establish priorities and achieve progress on specific steps. Essential subjects should be identified in which many nations have a stake, and to which many must make a contribution. A timetable for meetings between heads of government would help build a diplomatic structure for engagement, within which foreign ministers, defense ministers and others can work together between the meetings of government leaders.

• Regional dialogues. Such a joint enterprise should include and be reinforced by regional dialogues. Top political, defense and military leaders should explore with their counterparts a range of practical steps on core security issues. The Euro-Atlantic region—an area that includes Europe, Russia and the U.S., four nuclear weapon states and over 90% of global nuclear inventories—will need to play a central role. China and other key states will need to be engaged both on multilateral issues and within their own regions.

The continuing risk posed by nuclear weapons remains an overarching strategic problem, but the pace of work doesn't now match the urgency of the threat. The consequences of inaction are potentially catastrophic, and we must continue to ask: How will citizens react to the chaos and suffering of a nuclear attack? Won't they demand to know what could have been done to prevent this? Our age has stolen fire from the gods. Can we confine this awesome power to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?

Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982-89. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994-97. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973-77. Mr. Nunn is a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. All are distinguished fellows or visiting distinguished fellows at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

Originally published in The Wall Street Journal on March March 5, 2013 (behind paywall). Accessed via Nuclear Security Project.

Previous op-eds published in The Wall Street Journal can be found on the Nuclear Security Project website.

The fiscal cliff and sequestration are coming upon us. Set to take effect this Friday, people are predicting and speculating across the board as to how exactly they will affect every day Americans. This page does a good job of explaining the sequester and the alternate options Congress may enact instead.

Sequestration stipulates that half the cuts will come from the Pentagon. Many people within Washington have been saying this is unacceptable, that any cuts to the Pentagon will undermine our security. This is known to be false. There are ways the Pentagon can be cut. Check out our Budget page to see some examples of waste and how that can be avoided in the future. There’s also a video that depicts what the Pentagon cuts would really look like.

However, there is a specific topic to discuss when talking about cutting the Pentagon and wasting billions of dollars: nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons have gotten quite a bit of press recently. That’s a good thing, as more and more people are starting to realize just how expensive and unnecessary the nuclear arsenal is.

For example, the United States is slated to spend more than $600 billion over the next ten years on nuclear weapons. Not all of that is spent on creating more weapons. The government will spend about 10% of that money on nuclear threat reduction, helps to secure loose nuclear material around the world. $100 billion will be spent on cleaning up the nuclear waste that is one of the weapons’ legacy.

But a good portion of that $600 billion will be spent on unnecessary, time-consuming modernization projects. When the New START Treaty was ratified in 2010, part of the agreement was that the arsenal would be modernized. Part of that modernization project is to spend $10 billion extending the life of the B61 nuclear bomb, making it the most expensive nuclear weapon per warhead in the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal. The real catch? The B61 nuclear bomb, which is stationed European bases, does not play any critical role in our national security. It is common knowledge that the B61 nuclear bomb is there for symbolic purposes.*

Another part of the modernization is to build 12 nuclear submarines—each estimated to cost $6-7 billion each. In March 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report which estimated the total cost to be $90.4 billion (a brief summary is on page 152). Not only are these submarines already estimated to be incredibly expensive, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) came out with a separate report in July 2012 which said that the high cost of the nuclear submarine program is could possibly have an effect on the Navy’s other shipbuilding and non-shipbuilding programs**.

Maintaining and modernizing the nuclear arsenal is expensive. Even though the number of nuclear weapons has been reduced over the past two decades, the thousands of weapons still in existence are better tuned for the Cold War, not today. We don’t need to have hundreds of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert at all times, nor should we spend billions of dollars extending the life of weapons or building new ones when the government is still in the process of reducing the arsenal to the size mandated by New START.

Creating a smarter and more efficient nuclear weapons policy will not fix all our budget problems. We will still have to spend money on them—on things like non-proliferation programs or cleaning nuclear waste or making sure the current arsenal is safe and secure. Nevertheless, a nuclear arsenal that is smaller and better suited to our times would certainly go a long way over the long term in reducing waste at the Pentagon.

Contact your representatives today and urge them to cut the Pentagon by $1 trillion over the next ten years, starting with our unnecessary and outdated nuclear weapons.

*Jeffrey Lewis, “A Steal at $10 Billion,” Foreign Policy, September 5, 2012.

**"An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2013 Shipbuilding Plan,” Congressional Budget Office, pg. 17, July 2012.

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chair, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. Senate
Washington DC 20510

Dear Senator Feinstein:

As representatives of national organizations working on global security issues, we respectfully request that Congress withhold funding in fiscal year (FY) 2014 for the B61 bomb Life Extension Program (LEP) until a public, independent review of technical options, U.S. security requirements and scheduling alternatives is completed.

To be clear, we support the cost-­‐effective maintenance of nuclear weapons until they are retired from the stockpile. However, there may be alternatives to the planned B61 LEP, currently estimated to cost from $7 to $10 billion, which are more budget-­‐friendly. Moreover, because future arms reductions may make it unnecessary to extend the life of some or all of these bombs, it makes sense to delay the B61 LEP for as long as practical.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which oversees the B61 program, currently estimates that it will cost about $7 billion and produce its first rebuilt bomb in FY 2019. But in July 2012, a Pentagon review projected that the program would cost $10.4 billion and take three years longer to start. Four hundred B61s are reportedly planned for refurbishment, at roughly $25 million per bomb.

The United States currently keeps about 180 tactical B61s in Europe to assure allies of the U.S. commitment to NATO. However, U.S. and NATO military leaders recognize that U.S. strategic nuclear forces—not tactical forces in Europe—provide the ultimate guarantee of Alliance security. Moreover, some NATO members, such as Germany, have called for the B61 to be removed from Europe. It is possible that a future agreement between Russia and the United States would, as the Senate has directed, address tactical nuclear weapons, which could reduce or eliminate these warheads. Thus, tactical B61 bombs might not be deployed a decade from now, when the proposed rebuilding program would be complete.

Even if tactical B61s remain in service, there appears to be no rush to rebuild them. B61s, like all modern nuclear weapons, have two components (neutron generators and gas transfer systems) that have limited life and are replaced on a regular basis. However, the scope of the B61 LEP goes well beyond these limited life components and involves replacing hundreds of other non-­‐nuclear parts, such as switches, foams, and cables, as well as the bomb’s uranium secondary.

These parts are continually assessed by the stockpile surveillance program, run by Sandia National Laboratories, and, according to scientists with weapons expertise, there is no evidence that they need to be replaced soon. Moreover, the strategic B61-­‐7 already underwent significant upgrades in 2009. Leaving aside the limited-­‐life parts, it does not appear that the B61 LEP must be completed by 2022, as NNSA asserts.

Thus, Congress has time to explore alternatives to a $10 billion B61 LEP. Indeed, simply replacing the limited life components could provide a 15-­‐year window that would allow the NNSA time to complete the delayed W76 LEP. This schedule change would relieve budget pressure and increase clarity about the future need for the B61 before the United States makes major investments in retaining it.

Safety concerns are another motivation for the B61 LEP. Tactical versions of the B61 stored in Europe are potentially more vulnerable to theft than the strategic B61 bombs based in the United States. The NNSA has proposed to address this concern, in part, by folding four of the B61 versions into a new one, the B61-­‐12, that would have less fissile material than some current versions.

Rather than pursue this expensive consolidation, the security of forward-­‐deployed B61s could be enhanced in other ways, such as by providing more secure storage in Europe, consolidating the warheads at fewer locations, or by stationing these bombs in the United States.

Another option would be to scale-­‐back the program by replacing only the parts that are known to be at the end of their lives and onlyfor the weapons that are likely to still be deployed a decade from now. For example, the NNSA could only upgrade the strategic B61-­‐7, of which there are an estimated 120 in service, and replace only the limited-­‐life parts and possibly the radar (which is an old model that still uses vacuum tubes). As for the roughly 180 tactical bombs based in Europe, such limited upgrades could be made only for those planned to be deployed into the 2020s. This scaled-­‐back approach could save billions of dollars.

In FY 2012, Congress required an independent review of the B61 LEP by JASON, a group of independent science advisers to the government. That review found no technical problems with NNSA’s preferred option for the B61 LEP, but indicates that there is no technicalrationale for the timing of the planned LEP. Rather, the report states that keeping to the schedule is important for “political reasons involving our NATO allies.”

In light of its high cost, uncertain need, and lack of immediacy, Congress should fence funding for the B61 LEP in FY 2014 until a public, unclassified review of a range of reasonable alternatives is completed.

We appreciate your attention and would be happy to meet with you about the concerns raised in this letter. (For purposes of correspondence, please contact Tom Z. Collina, Arms Control Association, tcollina@armscontrol.org, 202-­‐463-­‐8270 x104)

Sincerely,

Jay Coghlan
Executive Director
Nuclear Watch New Mexico
Santa Fe, NM

David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Katherine M. Fuchs
Program Director
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Lisbeth Gronlund, Ph.D.
Co-­‐Director and Senior Scientist, Global Security Program
Union of Concerned Scientists

William D. Hartung
Director, Arms and Security Project
Center for International Policy

Katie Heald
Coordinator
Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

John Isaacs
Executive Director
Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

Marylia Kelley
Executive Director
Tri-­‐Valley CAREs
Livermore, CA

Daryl G. Kimball
Executive Director and
Tom Z. Collina
Research Director
Arms Control Association

Hans Kristensen
Director, Nuclear Information Project
Federation of American Scientists

Paul Kawika Martin
Political and Communications Director
Peace Action

Bobbie Paul
Executive Director
Georgia Women's Action for New Directions (Georgia WAND)
Atlanta, GA

Jon Rainwater
Executive Director
Peace Action West

Kathy Crandall Robinson
Senior Public Policy Director
Women's Action for New Directions

Catherine Thomasson, MD
Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Mary Kaszynski and Katharyn Nicolle

February 05, 2013

It has been two years since the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) entered into force - with strong bipartisan support in the United States Senate. The New START Treaty, which replaces the expired START I Treaty, brings U.S. nuclear policies in line with security challenges of the 21st century and provides for balanced reductions in the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

Several benefits to U.S. national security are associated with the Treaty:

New START enhances the United States’ nuclear force planning.

Without the New START Treaty, the United States would not have the ability to verify what the Russians are doing. This would force the U.S. military to plan for a “worst case scenario” and overinvest in nuclear capabilities to prepare for a potential Russian buildup.

With the Treaty, the U.S. military can avoid wasting money on unnecessary nuclear weapons and use the best threat assessments available to structure its nuclear forces.

Inspections and other verification measures under New START enhance transparency.

The United States and Russia improved and streamlined the verification regime for New START, based on lessons learned from previous arms control agreements.

Data exchanges provide the transfer of technical information on numbers, locations, weapons, and facilities that are subject to the Treaty. Since entry into force the U.S. and Russia each conducted 36 on-site inspections, the maximum number allowed by the Treaty (18 per year). The countries have exchanged over 3,500 data notifications since the Treaty’s entry into force.[1] These on-site inspections and data exchanges allow the United States to verify the size and composition of the Russian nuclear arsenal on a continual basis.

The Treaty also guarantees that U.S. national technical means of surveillance, such as satellites, are not subject to Russian interference, and that the United States will have a variety of tools at its disposal for monitoring Russian compliance.

The ratification of New START has strengthened strategic stability between the United States and Russia.

The New START Treaty increases U.S.-Russian strategic stability by maintaining the predictability of nuclear relations between the two countries.

The New START verification regime allows the United States to gain greater insight into Russia’s nuclear arsenal. This increased flow of information allows for greater stability between the United States and Russia and provides a basis for pursuing the reduction of other weapons, such as Russia’s large stockpile of nonstrategic (short-range, low-yield) nuclear weapons.[2]

The United States is free to modernize its nuclear forces, and a bipartisan consensus exists for doing so.

Under the New START Treaty, the United States can safely reduce a number of outdated weapons while investing in steps to ensure the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. As stated in the Senate resolution to ratify, the United States is committed to “a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities” to ensure the “safety, reliability, and performance” of the U.S. arsenal.[3]

A tough fiscal environment has led to budget cuts for many defense-related programs, but bipartisan support for nuclear modernization has remained strong. In fiscal year 2012, Congress provided more than $7 billion for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons activities, an increase of $340 million over the previous year. The president continued this trend in 2013, requesting a 5% increase in the nuclear weapons activities budget from the 2012 appropriated level.[4]

New START provides for an appropriate deterrent in line with modern threats.

The New START Treaty allows the United States to deploy 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads and retain 800deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles – intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers – and 700 deployed. As Senator Lamar Alexander (R-TN) pointed out, each of these warheads is “up to 30 times more powerful” than those used during World War II.[5]

Thanks to the data exchanges mandated under the Treaty, the United States now knows that Russia has already reduced its deployed strategic nuclear forces below the New START limit.[6]

New START preserves the United States’ missile defense independence.

The New START Treaty does not limit the United States’ ability to develop and deploy missile defenses. In fact, as Missile Defense Agency chief Lt. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, New START actually “reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program in key areas.”[7]

Since New START ratification, the U.S. has advanced its missile defense plans, increasing the number of missile interceptors in California and Alaska and conducting the first successful test of a next-generation missile interceptor in May 2012. The U.S. continues to work with NATO allies on plans for European missile defense. At the 2012 Chicago summit, NATO leaders declared “NATO has initiated a capability that, although limited in its initial phase, can provide real protection against ballistic missile attack.”[8]

New START allows the United States to focus on other vital nuclear security issues.

The New START Treaty was necessary to manage the threats posed by deployed strategic nuclear weapons. More than one year of “positive and pragmatic” New START implementation provides a sound basis for negotiating reductions in nonstrategic weapons, where Russia has a large advantage, and non-deployed nuclear weapons. These two categories of weapons have never been limited or monitored under an arms control agreement.[9]

In addition to future nuclear weapons negotiations, the Treaty places the United States in a better position to deal with a whole range of other nuclear security issues, such as nuclear proliferation and securing nuclear materials.[10]

Mary Kaszynski is a Policy Analyst at the American Security Project specializing in nuclear security and arms control issues. Katharyn Nicolle is a Policy Analyst and Research Intern specializing in nonproliferation, terrorism, and Russia.

End Notes

[1.] U.S. Department of State, “New START Treaty Inspection Activities,” January 17, 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm (accessed February 1, 2013). @Gottemoeller, (January 31, 2013), “The U.S. and #Russia each exercised the full right under the Treaty to conduct 18 annual New START inspections in this 2nd Treaty year.” https://twitter.com/Gottemoeller/status/297008635450634240. U.S. Department of State, “New START” January 17, 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm (accessed February 1, 2013)

[2.] Union of Concerned Scientists, “New START Overview: Verification, Force Structure, and Requirements,” May 26, 2011, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/policy_issues/new-start-general-fact-sheet.html (accessed June 13, 2012).

[3.] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, New START Treaty: Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification, 112th Cong. 1st Session, http://foreign.senate.gov/download/?id=E4C3A1B3-D023-4F58-8690-DF624C73548C (accessed June 13, 2012).

[4.] Department of Energy Fiscal Year 2013 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, February 2012, http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/02-12-inlinefiles/FY%202013%20Congressional%20Budget%20for%20NNSA.pdf (accessed June 13, 2012).

[5.] U.S. Senate, Floor Statement by Senator Lamar Alexander, December 21, 2010, http://alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Multimedia&ContentRecord_id=52b7462e-dd6d-42a0-a419-025b87585d51&ContentType_id=0ec10363-3bf1-4c12-8da4-af69332295df&Group_id=21953845-05d8-4679-ac01-8f80b7f2202d (accessed June 13, 2012).

[6.] U.S. Department of State, “New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” October 3, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/198582.htm (accessed February 1, 2013).

[7.] Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Unclassified Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly,” Hearing on The New START Treaty: Views from the Pentagon, June 16, 2010, p 2-3, http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/O%27Reilly,%20Gen.%20Patrick%20J.pdf (accessed June 13, 2012).

[8.] The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Chicago Summit – NATO Capabilities,” May 20, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/20/fact-sheet-chicago-summit-nato-capabilities (accessed June 13, 2012).

[9.] Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, “Meeting the Next Challenges on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” Keynote Speech at the Arms Control Association’s Annual Meeting, June 4, 2012, http://www.armscontrol.org/events/Join-ACA-June-4-Our-Annual-Meeting#keynote (accessed June 13, 2012).

[10.] Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher, “New START Treaty and the Obama Administration’s Nonproliferation Agenda,” a Special Briefing, March 29, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/us/139205.htm (accessed June 13, 2012).

American Security Project
1100 New York Ave NW
Washington, DC 20005

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington DC 20510

Dear Representative Pelosi,

Press reports indicate that the Obama administration is considering suspending the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility project as an option in the event of sequestration.

Congress should strongly support such a decision.

Originally envisioned as a way to reduce quantities of U.S. and Russia weapons-grade plutonium, the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (the MOX plant) initiative has evolved into a massive pork project. The centerpiece of the MOX program is a plutonium-based fuel fabrication facility being built at the Energy Department’s Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. SRS is part of the U.S. complex of nuclear weapons facilities, and the MOX project is helping replace lost funding from other declining projects at the site.

By canceling the MOX plant, the United States could save billions of dollars, plus significant additional operating costs, while reducing the chances that weapons-usable nuclear material could fall into the wrong hands.

Reasons to Cancel the MOX Plant

1. Funding the MOX program puts at risk other, more effective non-proliferation programs, such as the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. In the current budget environment, cuts in some programs are unavoidable. The MOX program is one of the most expensive. The construction cost of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at the Savannah River Site alone is currently estimated at roughly $5 billion, a significant increase over the initial cost estimate of $1 billion. A forthcoming revised budget of the program is projected to increase this estimate by $2 billion and create further delays. Operating costs once the plant starts up are estimated to contribute about an additional $10 billion over twenty years.

2. The MOX program, beset by delays and unquantified risks, creates a product that no one wants. Because it uses plutonium, MOX fuel is more expensive and hazardous to fabricate, transport, store, and use than the standard all-uranium fuel currently used by U.S. nuclear reactors. A serious accident involving MOX fuel would be more severe than one involving uranium fuel. Since Duke Energy withdrew from the program in 2008, NNSA has been unable to recruit another U.S. utility to accept MOX fuel.

3. Russia’s partner program fails to meet the nonproliferation goals of the effort. The MOX program was devised in the 1990s as a nonproliferation program in conjunction with Russia. NNSA has stated that MOX was chosen over other disposition paths to satisfy Russia, but Russia halted its program to use MOX in its light water reactors. Russia is currently pursuing MOX use in “breeder” reactors that can be used to make more plutonium than they burn, undermining the entire justification for the program. At this point, Russia will likely continue to pursue its plutonium disposition program regardless of what the United States does because it is commingled with its breeder reactor program.

4. The “cure” that the MOX program promises threatens to be worse than the “disease.” Conversion of plutonium to MOX fuel involves many stages of transportation and bulk processing of plutonium, providing myriad opportunities both in the United States and Russia for theft of the material. Yet to cut costs and make MOX more palatable for utilities, NNSA has encouraged the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to reduce safeguards and security requirements on MOX fuel. The NRC has already weakened security requirements for MOX fuel storage at reactor sites and is considering further security and safeguards rollbacks for MOX. The plant was originally designed by the French, who have weaker material control and security standards. By weakening security at home and sending the wrong signal to Russia, this undermines one of the chief goals of plutonium disposition—to reduce the likelihood of diversion or theft of plutonium.

5. Sensible, less expensive alternatives exist to the MOX proposal. The National Academy of Sciences looked at options for disposing of excess plutonium and identified an alternative means of plutonium disposition known as “immobilization,” which entails mixing the plutonium with radioactive waste and imbedding it in large, heavy glass canisters. NNSA determined that the immobilization would be cheaper than MOX. Despite this, the United States proceeded with the MOX option because it believed that Russia would only be interested in this option. As cheaper and quicker options to dispose of plutonium as waste exist, it is imperative that the NNSA immediately begin a study to analyze alternative disposition options.

We strongly encourage you to support any proposal to suspend or cancel the MOX plant. The program does not deserve Congressional backing.

Sincerely,

Robert Alvarez
Senior Scholar
Institute for Policy Studies*
Former senior policy advisor to the secretary and deputy assistant secretary for national security and the environment, Department of Energy

Joni Arends
Executive Director
Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety
Santa Fe, NM

Glenn Carroll
Coordinator
Nuclear Watch South
Atlanta, GA

Jay Coghlan
Executive Director
Nuclear Watch New Mexico
Santa Fe, NM

Kathy Crandall Robinson
Senior Public Policy Director
Women's Action for New Directions

David Culp
Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Katherine M. Fuchs
Program Director
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Marylia Kelley
Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs
Livermore, CA

Paul Kawika Martin
Organizing, Political and PAC Director
Peace Action & Peace Action Education Fund

Judith Mohling
Coordinator
Nuclear Nexus Project, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center
Boulder, CO

Mary Olson
Nuclear Information and Resource Service
Southeast Office
Asheville, NC

Bobbie Paul
Executive Director
Georgia Women's Action for New Directions (Georgia WAND)
Atlanta, GA

Eric Sapp
Founding Partner, Eleison
Executive Director, American Values Network

Ann Suellentrop MSRN
Program Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility-Kansas City
Kansas City, KA

Kendra Ulrich
Nuclear Campaigner
Friends of the Earth

Frank von Hippel
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University*
Former assistant director for national security, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy

Stephen Young
Senior Analyst, Global Security Program
Union of Concerned Scientists

*Affiliation listed for identification purposes only

cc: Secretary Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy

October 16, 2012
The Honorable Barack Obama
President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama,

As 116 local, regional, and national organizations from across the United States representing hundreds of thousands of individuals, we applaud your work to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. We are pleased to see that your administration has undertaken a thoughtful process to review and revise US nuclear weapons policy.

We urge you to use the results of this review to move us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. The eventual elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons requires us to rethink the role of these weapons of mass destruction in the 21st century. As you stated in Prague in 2009, it’s time to “put an end to outdated Cold War thinking”; there is no national security rationale for maintaining a massive nuclear arsenal. In today’s world, nuclear weapons are a liability, not an asset, and the US can maintain its security while taking responsible steps to reduce our stockpile and work with other countries to do the same.

In addition to compelling moral and security arguments to move toward elimination of nuclear weapons, there is a strong fiscal argument. At a time of intense budget pressures in Washington, DC, and economic struggles around the country, conservative estimates put our spending on the nuclear weapons arsenal at $30 billion a year. It is unwise to continue to invest billions of dollars in weapons we don’t need to keep us safe.

We encourage you to use this opportunity to announce further steps to reduce all types of nuclear weapons well below the levels required by the New START Treaty, engage the other nuclear weapons states on transparency and nuclear posture, and push for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Thank you for your leadership in reducing America’s reliance on nuclear weapons and bringing us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons.

Sincerely,

National & International Organizations

Susan Gordon, Director
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Carol Blythe, President
Alliance of Baptists

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
Arms Control Association

Katie Heald, Coordinator
Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

Nathan Hosler, Advocacy and Peace Witness Ministries
Church of the Brethren

Deborah Weinstein, Executive Director
Coalition on Human Needs

Eli McCarthy, Director of Justice and Peace
Conference of Major Superiors of Men

Nancy Soderberg, President
The Connect U.S. Fund*

John Isaacs, Executive Director
Council for a Livable World

Charles D. Ferguson, President
Federation of American Scientists

David Culp, Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Katherine Prizeman, International Coordinator
Global Action to Prevent War

Carleen Pickard, Executive Director
Global Exchange

Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space

Ira Helfand, MD, Co‐President
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Robert Naiman, Policy Director
Just Foreign Policy

Kathleen McNeely, Director
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns

Sister Simone Campbell, Executive Director
NETWORK, A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby

David Krieger, President
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Sr. Patricia Chappell, SNDdeN, Executive Director
Pax Christi USA

Kevin Martin, Executive Director
Peace Action

Catherine Thomasson, MD, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Jean Stokan, Director, Institute Justice Team
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas

Barry Blechman, Distinguished Fellow
The Stimson Center*

The Rev. Tyler Wigg‐Stevenson, Director
Two Futures Project

Lisbeth Gronlund, Co‐Director, Global Security Program
Union of Concerned Scientists

Rev. Michael Neuroth, Policy Advocate on International Issues
United Church of Christ, Justice and Witness Ministries

Mark Harrison, Director, Peace with Justice Program
United Methodist General Board of Church and Society

Rev. Craig Roshaven, Witness Ministries Director
Unitarian Universalist Association

Susan Shaer, Executive Director
Women’s Action for New Directions

Arizona

Barbara Warren, MD, MPH, Chair
Arizona Chapter, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Arkansas

JoAnne Mills, Vice Chair
Arkansas Women’s Action for New Directions

California

Jon Rainwater, Executive Director
Peace Action West

Denise Duffield, Associate Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility‐Los Angeles

Harry Wang, President
Physicians for Social Responsibility‐Sacramento

Dr. Robert Gould, President
SF Bay Area Chapter, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri‐Valley CAREs

Colorado

Bob Kinsey, Co‐Chair
The Colorado Coalition for the Prevention of Nuclear War

Mary Casper, Coordinator
Pax Christi Denver

Judith Mohling, Coordinator, Nuclear Nexus
Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center

Florida

Lynn Ringenberg, President
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Florida

Georgia

Bobbie Paul, Executive Director
Georgia Women’s Action for New Directions

Glenn Carroll, Coordinator
Nuclear Watch South

Evelyn Gibson Lowery, Founder & President
Southern Christian Leadership Conference/W.O.M.E.N., Inc.

Betsy Rivard, Chair
United Nations Association/Atlanta Chapter

Idaho

Liz Woodruff, Executive Director
Snake River Alliance

Illinois

David Borris, President
Chicago Area Peace Action

Sarah Lovinger, MA, MD, Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility Chicago

Iowa

Mike Carberry, Director
Green State Solutions

Maine

Rosalie Paul, Clerk
American Friends Service Committee, Maine*

Bruce Gagnon, Co‐Coordinator
Bring Our War $$ Home Campaign

Michael Brennan, Mayor
City of Portland*

William Whitney
Let Cuba Live of Maine

Douglas Dransfield, MD, Secretary
Maine Chapter, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Rev. Jill Saxby, Executive Director
Maine Council of Churches

Rep. Mark Bryant (D‐Windham)
Maine House of Representatives*

Denise Dreher, Coordinator
Pax Christi Maine

Jessica Moore, Chair
Peace Action Maine

Professor Douglas Allen
Peace and Justice Center of Eastern Maine*

Larry Dansinger, Coordinator
Resources for Organizing and Social Change

Daniel Avener, President
Veterans for Peace, Chapter 003

Maryland

Max Obuszewski
Physicians for Social Responsibility, Chesapeake Bay Area

Massachusetts

John Pastore, MD, Board of Directors
Greater Boston Physicians for Social Responsibility

Richard Krushnic
Kahal B’raira Middle East Working Group

Shelagh Foreman, Program Director
Massachusetts Peace Action

Henry Rosenberg, MD, Treasurer
Pioneer Valley Physicians for Social Responsibility

Steven Brion‐Meisels, Educational Consultant
Supporting School Communities*

Michigan

Sister Betsy Meagher, CSJ
Congregation of St. Joseph, Kalamazoo*

Sister Barbara Hansen, OP
Culture of Peace Committee, Dominican Sisters ‐ Grand Rapids

Fern Katz, President
Women’s Action for New Directions Southeast Michigan

Minnesota

Judi Poulson, Chair
Fairmont, MN Peace Group

Polly Mann, Member authorized to act
St. Joan of Arc Peacemakers, St. Joan of Arc Catholic Church, Minneapolis

Missouri

Edward Smith, Safe Energy Director
Missouri Coalition for the Environment

Henry Stoever, Chair of Board of Directors
PeaceWorks, Kansas City

Ann Suellentrop, MSRN, Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility‐Kansas City

New Hampshire

Joe Sullivan, District Executive
Unitarian Universalist Association – Northern New England District*

New Jersey

David Mortensen, Chair
August 9 Saving Lives Task Force

Madelyn Hoffman, Executive Director
New Jersey Peace Action

New Mexico

Jay Coghlan, Director
Nuclear Watch New Mexico

Michelle Victoria‐Delon, Co‐Organizer
NukeFreeNow

Beryl Schwartz, Board Member
Peace Action New Mexico

New York

Rev. David J. Robb, Associate Minister
All Souls Unitarian Church

Guy C. Quinlan, Chair
All Souls Nuclear Disarmament Task Force

Barbara Warren, Executive Director
Citizens’ Environmental Coalition

Sally Jones, Chair
Peace Action Fund of New York State

Alicia Godsberg, Executive Director
Peace Action New York State

Susan Spivack
Peacemakers of Schoharie County*

Elaine Klein, Coordinator
Schenectady Neighbors for Peace*

Martha Conte
Westchester People’s Action Committee

North Carolina

Ellen Thomas, Director
Proposition One Campaign

Lewis Patrie
Western North Carolina Physicians for Social Responsibility*

Ohio

Nina McLellan, Co‐President
Cleveland Peace Action

Sharon Cowdrey, President
Miamisburg Environmental Safety and Health

Vina Colley, President
Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security (PRESS)

Oregon

Michael Carrigan, Community Organizer
Community Alliance of Lane County

Kelly Campbell, Executive Director
Oregon Physicians for Social Responsibility

Susan Cundiff, Chapter Leader
Oregon Women’s Action for New Directions

Jill Mackie, Chairwoman
Oregon Branch – Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Herbert Rothschild, Jr, Chair of the Board of Directors
Peace House, Ashland

Clayton C. Knight, President
Veterans for Peace, Chapter 72

Pennsylvania

Donna Cuthburt, Volunteer
Alliance for a Clean Environment*

Edward Aguilar, Director
Pennsylvania Peace Voter

Tammy Murphy, Director
Project for Nuclear Awareness

Tennessee

Ralph Hutchison, Coordinator
Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance

Texas

Mavis Belisle, Director
JustPeace

Jerry Stein, Coordinator
The Peace Farm

Chris Masey, Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility Austin

Karen Hadden, Executive Director
Sustainable Energy and Economic Development (SEED) Coalition

Utah

Christine Meecham, Chairperson
Dialogue for Peace

Deb Sawyer, Coordinator
Utah Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Washington

Leonard Eiger, Outreach Coordinator
Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action

Steven Gilbert, Director
The Institute of Neurotoxicology and Neurological Disorders

Tom Shea, Outreach Committee
Puget Sound Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Tracy Bier, Executive Director
Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility

Wisconsin

John LaForge, Co‐Director
Nukewatch

Pam Kleiss, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility Wisconsin

*Name of organization for identification purposes only

Find out more about FCNL’s work to secure loose nukes and build support for the next step toward a safer world through ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

In the Continuing Resolution passed by Congress and signed by the president, the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility, a new nuclear bomb plant, at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico was terminated. The Continuing Resolution contained language that did not allocated funds for the new facility. This is viewed as a major victory for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation activists.

The CMRR was envisioned as a replacement for an existing plutonium research facility and was meant to help update the laboratory’s capabilities to analyze and store plutonium. Originally, it was estimated to cost under $400 million*, but a 2012 Government Accountability Office (GAO) review found that the CMRR’s cost had ballooned up to between $4 and $6 billion, nearly a six-fold increase from the initial price tag. The same review also found that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was expecting an 8 to 12 year delay in the construction of the facility**. Furthermore, the NNSA had released information in February saying that it had “existing infrastructure” which could meet its plutonium pit mission needs without the proposed CMRR***.

In addition to the overrun costs and major delays, both the National Nuclear Security Administration and Government Accountability Office found that the construction of the CMRR facility may not have been enough to meet all stockpile and plutonium research-related needs, possibly requiring further construction of yet another facility in the future**.

FCNL, along with the help of other nuclear disarmament organizations, lobbied and argued that the CMRR was unnecessary and an example of wasteful spending. The defunding of the CMRR is yet another step towards a nuclear free world.

To read a letter sent to Senator Levin by FCNL and ten other organizations, click here.

References:

*A Victory for Good Government

**New Plutonium Research Facility at Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs

***No Funding for a New Bomb Plant

Preparation of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment on Laser Enrichment Technology Essential to Sound U.S. Nonproliferation Policy

Commissioner Allison M. Macfarlane, Chairman

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555
August 28, 2012

Dear Chairman Macfarlane,

We are writing to you as organizations and experts concerned with nuclear nonproliferation policy to express grave concern that licensing technology for laser enrichment of uranium poses a serious threat to our security. We request an adequate Nuclear Proliferation Assessment before a licensing decision is made by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the newly developed laser technology for enrichment of uranium.

As you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now considering issuance of a license to GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment LLC for operation of a large-scale laser enrichment facility based on SILEX (separation of isotopes by laser excitation). Before a final determination is made on issuance of that license, we strongly urge the Commission to require preparation of a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment on this new technology as it holds potential proliferation risks. Your decision on this matter is not simply a licensing decision but is of great importance to overall U.S. non-proliferation policy.

The NRC itself, in a 2008 manual on enrichment technology from the USNRC Technical Training Center, stated that laser enrichment presents “extra proliferation concerns due to the small size and high separation factors.” And, various experts have determined that laser enrichment poses a risk that needs to be assessed. These views were succinctly summarized in a July 30, 2012 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article titled “SILEX and proliferation,”[1] by Dr. R. Scott Kemp, assistant professor of nuclear science and engineering at MIT, where he stated that “SILEX is a new enrichment technology that happens to be well suited for making nuclear weapons. The benefits of commercializing SILEX are not yet established, but the proliferation risks are significant.”

Though the NRC is on record as stating that the National Environmental Policy Act does not require preparation of a proliferation assessment,[2] the Congressional Research Service determined in a March 27, 2012 memorandum[3] that the Commission has legal authority “to promulgate a regulation requiring that applicants provide the commission with a proliferation risk assessment as part of the license application process.”

Most importantly, it is the statutory responsibility of the Commission to assess proliferation threats associated with technologies it regulates. Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 states that the NRC “shall also include views and recommendations regarding the policies and actions of the United States to prevent proliferation which are the statutory responsibility” of the agency. Likewise, the Atomic Energy Act stipulates that “the Commission shall prescribe such regulations or orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the Nation's common defense and security with regard to control, ownership, or possession of any equipment or device, or important component part especially designed for such equipment or device, capable of separating the isotopes of uranium or enriching uranium in the isotope 235.”

While the NRC could complete and evaluate a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment before making a determination in the singular case of laser technology, we also support the Commission’s approval of the petition of November 18, 2010 by Dr. Francis Slakey of the American Physical Society which requests “that the NRC amend its regulations regarding the domestic licensing of special nuclear material to include proliferation assessments as part of the licensing process.” Many of the signatories of this letter are already on record with the NRC in support of that petition. For further information about this letter or to contact any of the signers, please contact Alfred Meyer, 202-2158208, alfred.c.meyer@gmail.com.

The pursuit of sound, consistent and effective U.S. nonproliferation policies is an important role of the Commission. We believe that it is clearwhat action you must take on behalf of the entire U.S. Government in this matter. Your requirement for the preparation of an adequate Nuclear Proliferation Assessment will not only strengthen U.S. nonproliferation policies but also garner widespread support for the Commission’s work in promoting “the Nation's common defense and security.”

Sincerely,

Catherine Thomasson, MD, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Frank N. von Hippel, Professor of Public and International Affairs
Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Former Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office for Science and Technology Policy (1993-94)
Co-chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials

Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director
Natural Resources Defense Council

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
Arms Control Association

Charles D. Ferguson* President
Federation of American Scientists

Peter Bradford, Adjunct Professor
Vermont Law School
Former commissioner, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, LBJ School of Public Affairs
Coordinator, Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project
University of Texas at Austin

Leonard S. Spector* Executive Director, Washington, DC Office
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Ira Helfand, MD, Co-President
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War

James Acton, Ph.D.* Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Paul Ingram, Executive Director
British American Security Information Council

David Culp, Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Jeffery Patterson, DO, President Elect
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Jim Walsh, Ph.D.*
Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Tom Clements, Non Proliferation Policy Director
Alliance for Nuclear Accountability

Harold A. Feiveson, Ph.D.
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University

Miles A. Pomper* Senior Research Associate
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

Paul F. Walker, Ph.D., Director, Environmental Security & Sustainability
Green Cross International & Global Green USA

Susan Shaer, Executive Director
Women's Action for New Directions

* Indicates institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only cc: Commissioners Magwood, Svinicki, Apostolakis and Ostendorff ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

RELEVANT LINKS:
Francis Slakey, November 10, 2010, Petition to NRC for Rulemaking Op-Ed
Op-Ed by Francis Slakey, March 2, 2011, The Hill, “Why we need to keep nuclear facilities in plain sight”
Article by William Broad, August 20, 2011, The New York Times, “Laser Advances in Nuclear Fuel Stir Terror Fear”:
Article by Elaine Grossman, May 24, 2012, Global Security Newswire, “Closely Held Report Discounts Proliferation Risk of Lasers for Making Nuclear Fuel”
Article by R. Scott Kemp, July 30, 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “SILEX and Proliferation”

[1] R. Scott Kemp, “Silex and proliferation,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July 30, 2012.
[2] Nuclear Regulatory Commission, March 15, 2010, Letter to Friends of the Earth
[3] Jeff Fortenberry, March 27, 2012, Congressional Research Service memorandum to Representative

Congressional Leaders

Sen. Carl Levin (MI)

Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

“The Cold War is over. I just think there’s a way over-reliance and cost that goes into our nuclear weapon system…. I’ve always believed that nuclear weapons are way overdone, we have way more than are needed to carry out their mission. Their mission can’t be to use them. They can only be to deter, or to achieve some form of deterrence.”

Paul Bedard, “Senator Puts U.S. Nuclear Arsenal in Doubt,” U.S. News & World Report, January 26, 2012.

“General [James] Cartwright has spoken recently on one area in the defense budget which surely is ripe for cuts, and that's the nuclear stockpile.”

Sen. Carl Levin, press conference, National Press Club, Washington, June 12, 2012.

Rep. Adam Smith (WA)

Ranking Democrat, House Armed Services Committee

“Do we need a nuclear stockpile of the size that we have in order to meet that deterrent mission? There’s some pretty compelling evidence that we don’t.… We have a lot [of nuclear weapons]. I think we have enough to meet that deterrent mission. How do you then right-size that force? Not much savings to be had. But when you’re looking at a way to meet what our strategy is in a post-Cold War world, if you will, I would think that our nuclear stockpile does not have to be as large as it was.”

Elaine M. Grossman, “Senior House Democrat Might Weigh Conventional-Only Bomber—But Not Yet,” Global Security Newswire, March 1, 2012.

“I also think that when you look at our nuclear policy, a nuclear policy that was built based on a premise of deterrence and mutually assured destruction with the then Soviet Union, I think there is clearly savings to be found in that area as well.”

Rep. Adam Smith, interview on Newsmakers, C-SPAN, July 22, 2012. Available at 4:57.

Rep. Ed Markey (MA)

Ranking Democrat, House Natural Resources Committee

“Our current nuclear arsenal has significant overkill that is built into it. Our country continues to spend more and more taxpayer money on nuclear weapons even though the President and the Senate have already agreed to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons, and even though there is a growing bipartisan consensus that the United States has an excessive number of nuclear weapons and that the United States spends far more than it needs to for a nuclear deterrent and defense.”

Congressional Record, July 18, 2012, p. H4988.

Rep. Rob Andrews (NJ)

Member, House Armed Services Committee

“I think that a nuclear arsenal that can blow up the world 24 times is quite sufficient and could be modernized and reduced in cost.”

Rep. Robert E. Andrews, speaking during the House Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Sequestration Implementation Options and the Effects on National Defense, August 1, 2012.

Rep. Marcy Kaptur (OH)

Ranking Democrat, House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee

"We must reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, working together with our friends in the international community."

Rep. Marcy Kaptur, Marcy Kaptur Agenda.

Former Rep. Norm Dicks (WA)

Ranking Democrat, House Appropriations Committee

“We simply don't need, and we can't afford to have and continue to produce all of these nuclear weapons that will, more than likely, never be used. They are a good deterrent and they have been an effective deterrent. Thank God for that. But the Cold War is over, and we are in a position today where we must reduce the size of our nuclear weapons force.”

Congressional Record, July 18, 2012, p. H 5041.

Current and Former World Leaders

Barack Obama

President of the United States

"The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War . . . Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not . . . as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act . . . So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

President Barack Obama, 2009 Prague speech, April 5, 2009.

Lawrence Eagleburger

Former Secretary of State

"The consequence of a world full of nuclear powers to me is so incomprehensible in terms of the dangers that that implies. One nuclear war is going to be the last nuclear - the last war, frankly, if it really gets out of hand. And I just don't think we ought to be prepared to accept that sort of thing."

Lawrence Eagleburger, On the Record, FOX News, October 3, 2009.

Robert McNamara

Former Secretary of Defense

“The indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will lead to the destruction of nations.”

Robert McNamara, Fog of War documentary, 2004.

Grace Cason, David Culp, Rachel Kent FCNL
Revised April 24, 2013

June 22, 2012

Chairman Carl Levin
Ranking Member John McCain
Senate Armed Services Committee
Room SR-228 Russell Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain:

We are concerned that your Committee chose to fund the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, even though President Obama requested no funding and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees in both Chambers provide no funding for this project. The Administration, the Appropriators, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory itself believe that this nearly $6 billion proposed facility is not needed at this time. We would go further and say the facility is not needed at all; it is a waste of taxpayer money and should be canceled. We urge you to consider new information from the Laboratory and from the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), both of which support alternative strategies to CMRR-NF.

As you know, CMRR-NF was envisioned as a replacement for an existing plutonium research facility at Los Alamos. It would play a role in the NNSA’s production of nuclear weapons components, called plutonium pits.

However, a growing body of nuclear weapons and policy experts agree that CMRR-NF is not necessary to maintain the nation’s robust nuclear weapons capability.¹ Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office has expressed concerns time and again that NNSA projects are consistently overpriced and significantly behind schedule.² Specifically, it found that CMRR-NF has faced a six-fold price increase and an 8 to 10 year delay.³

It is our understanding that Los Alamos recently released a 60-day study that determined that the Laboratory can maintain its plutonium pit manufacturing and sustainment needs without CMRR-NF. You have a “need to know” this vital information—which is not available to the public—and we urge you and other Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to review it before deciding to fund this unnecessary facility.

The NNSA already indicated in the Administration’s budget request this February that it had found “existing infrastructure”⁴ that could meet its plutonium pit mission needs without CMRRNF. We also have learned that the NNSA is expected to release its alternative plutonium strategy this summer, which will help determine if CMRR-NF is unnecessary to the nation’s security. It is only prudent to postpone your funding proposals for the project until after the agency releases its alternative strategy, which likely will identify existing facilities that can carry out the laboratory’s missions at significant savings.

Especially in this constrained fiscal environment, it is vital that all funding decisions be based on the most up-to-date information available. Given that viable secure, safe, and effective alternatives to CMRR-NF are available at a lower cost, we hope that you join the President and Appropriators in saving taxpayer dollars by ending this nuclear boondoggle.

We would welcome an opportunity to discuss this with you.

Sincerely,

Friends Committee on National Legislation
Rio Grande Foundation
Los Alamos Study Group
Rutherford Institute
National Taxpayers Union
Taxpayers for Common Sense
Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Taxpayers Protection Alliance
Peace Action New York State
Tri-Valley CAREs, Livermore
Project On Government Oversight

¹Project On Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Energy Department Plans to Waste Billions of Dollars on Unneeded Los Alamos Lab Facility, January 18, 2012. http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/nuclear-security-safety/energy-department-plans-to-waste-billions/nss-nwc-20120118-us-nuclear-weapons-complex.html

²Some examples include the following reports: Government Accountability Office, Department of Energy: Major Construction Projects Need a Consistent Approach for Assessing Technology Readiness to Help Avoid Cost Increases and Delays (GAO-07-336), March 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07336.pdf (Downloaded June 19, 2012); Government Accountability Office, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Proposed Acquisition Strategy Needs Further Clarification and Assessment (GAO-11-848), September 2011. http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/323619.pdf (Downloaded June 19, 2012).

³“Government Accountability Office, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at Los Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs (GAO-12-337), March 2012. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589582.pdf (Downloaded June 19, 2012).

⁴Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2013 Cuts, Consolidations, and Savings, p. 18. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/ccs.pdf (Downloaded June19, 2012).

American Baptist Churches

General Board

"We call on all nations to abolish their nuclear weapons and to dispose of such weapons in a manner that is not harmful to either the physical or political environment."

The American Baptist Churches have expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Catholic Church

Archbishop Renato Martino, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations

"Nuclear weapons cannot be justified and deserve condemnation. The world must move to the abolition of nuclear weapons though a universal, non-discriminatory ban with intensive inspection by universal authority."

The Catholic Church has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

"We must continue to say No to the very idea of nuclear war. The eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is more than a moral ideal; it should be a policy goal."

The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Church of the Brethren

Annual Conference

"The Church of the Brethren shall advocate the forging of bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties, which abolish nuclear, biological chemical and conventional weaponry."

The Church of the Brethren has expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Daoism

Min Zhiting, Chinese Taoist Organization President

"The hi-tech wars that assume biochemical and nuclear weapons are especially threatening to both human life and its environment. Hence our Daoists advocate that (1) only by challenging our attitudes to nature, recognizing the unity between man and nature, and following the way of nature can we realize sustainable development; (2) respect life, control desire, do not kill animals and expand our benevolence to all creatures; (3) stop any war and resolve disputes by negotiation, stop any damage to the environment and live in natural ways."

Episcopal Church

General Convention

"The 76th General Convention [of the Episcopal Church] calls upon US policy makers to determine a timely process for the dismantling of existing U.S. nuclear weapons while urging other countries to do likewise; and be it further resolved, that this Church urge the President and Congress to explore a moratorium on production of new nuclear arms."

The Episcopal Church has expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Churchwide Assembly

"Give high priority to arms control and reduction. We particularly urge a sharp reduction in the number of weapons of mass destruction. We call for arms control agreements that are substantial, equitable, verifiable and progressive."

The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Hinduism

Mahatma Gandhi

"So far as I can see, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be so-called laws of war, which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth. War knows no law except that of might. The atomic bomb brought an empty victory to the allied armies but it resulted for the time being in destroying the soul of Japan. What has happened to the soul of the destroying nation is yet too early to see…"

Islam

Muzammil Siddiqi, former Islamic Society of North America President

"We must say to ourselves first and then to the world that we want a total and universal ban on the possession and production of nuclear weapons. All countries, starting with those that have the largest amount of nuclear weapons, should destroy these weapons. There should be a total ban on their production and testing."

The American Muslim Council has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Jainism

Sagarmal Jain, Professor at Jainism Studies Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Jainist Institute

"It is through firm faith in mutual credibility and non-violence that humanity can get rid of this mad race for nuclear weapons and thus can solve the problem of its survival."

Judaism

Rabbi David Saperstein, Director of Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism

"We stand together in this House of God, informed by our values, aware of the horrible human cost of war and conflict, weary of the threat posed by nuclear proliferation – to call upon Congress, the President, the American Military and the American people to lead the way towards a process of nuclear reduction and disarmament."

The Central Conference of American Rabbis has expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Mennonite Church USA

General Assembly of the Mennonite Church (Predecessor to Mennonite Church USA)

"While we are confident that the ultimate destiny of the world is in God's hand, we cannot ignore humanity's apparent capability of annihilating God's creation via nuclear weapons. The church must plead and pray for reversal of the world's collision to course in manufacturing and deploying the most destructive weapons in all history."

The Mennonite Central Committee has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

National Association of Evangelicals

National Association of Evangelicals Board

"While the threat of armed nuclear conflict no longer captivates the public imagination as it did a generation ago, these weapons of mass destruction, now capable of being delivered in ever more sophisticated ways, continue to threaten humankind. Many argue that they weaken rather than strengthen our security. And so we prayerfully and boldly call on evangelicals to re-engage the national dialogue on nuclear peace and security in our globalizing age, making a distinctively evangelical contribution.."

Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

General Assembly

"The 215th General Assembly (2003) call[s] on all nations to fulfill their commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty and move together with the other nuclear powers, step by carefully inspected and verified step, to the abolition of nuclear weapons."

The Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Religious Society of Friends

Friends Committee on National Legislation

"We believe that nations must move toward comprehensive disarmament. We urge the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

"We also advocate that the United States take unilateral steps toward its own disarmament, believing that other nations will respond affirmatively to this example. The risks of disarmament are far smaller than the risks involved in the current course of weapons stockpiling and development."

The Friends Committee on National Legislation has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Unitarian Universalist Association

General Assembly

"The 1977 General Assembly of the Universalist Unitarian Association urges the United States Government to undertake substantial independent initiatives for nuclear disarmament, to challenge the other nuclear powers to match these initiatives with equivalent action and to review their disarmament policies periodically for progress."

The Unitarian Universalist Association has expressed support for the adoption of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

United Church of Christ

General Synod

"We declare our opposition to all weapons of mass destruction. All nations should: (1) declare that they will never use such weapons; (2) cease immediately the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons; (3) begin dismantling these arsenals, and; (4) while the process of dismantling is going on, negotiate comprehensive treaties banning all such future weapons by any nation."

The United Church of Christ has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

United Methodist Church

Council of Bishops

"We support the earliest possible negotiation of phased but rapid reduction of nuclear arsenals, while calling upon all other nuclear-weapon states to agree to parallel arms reductions, to the eventual goal of a mutual and verifiable dismantling of all nuclear armaments."

The United Methodist Church has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Interfaith and Ecumenical Statements

World Council of Churches

Executive Committee

"The only ultimate protection against nuclear weapons is their total elimination."

The World Council of Churches has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

General Assembly

"Jesus Christ, the good shepherd, declared that He had come to bring 'abundant life' to humanity. Nuclear weapons, which have the capacity to destroy entire cities and nations, and, indeed, all life on earth, represent the diametric opposite to this. In fact, the only thing they are capable of producing is 'abundant death.' The time has arrived to eliminate all of them, before they eliminate all of us. Be it therefore resolved that the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. hereby recommends itself to the total worldwide eradication of nuclear weapons."

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has expressed support for the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Canadian Council of Churches

Project Ploughshares, Peace and Security Council and Analysis for the Canadian Council of Churches

"[We] encourage explicit Canadian support, in voice and action, for the elimination of nuclear weapons and contribute, through NGO and government initiative, to international policies and actions that support nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation."

Conference of European Churches

Ecumenical Assembly

"[We] urge political decision-makers and the citizens to encourage disarmament and the development of nonviolent conflict management, and fostering without delay negotiation leading to complete elimination of nuclear arms, according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

1999 Parliament of the World's Religions

Parliament of Religious Leaders and People of Faith

"The threat posed to humanity and all other forms of life by the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons presents an unacceptable risk for this and future generations. This unacceptable risk presents a moral imperative for the elimination of nuclear weapons."

Muslim-Christian Initiative on the Nuclear Weapons Danger

Islamic Society of North America and Churches' Center for Theology and Public Policy

"We believe that chemical, biological, and particularly nuclear weapons do not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants and inevitably destroy innocent human life, even as they destroy other forms of life such as animal and vegetation, cause irrevocable damage to the environment for many generations to come and cause human suffering and disease. Therefore, we hold that these weapons are contrary to our religious and ethical principles."

FCNL developed this resource to illustrate the multidenominational support for disarmament of nuclear weapons in the United States and the rest of the world. The idea for its development and basis for research came from Howard Hallman, former moderator of zero-nukes.org. The information was compiled by Grace Cason, Nuclear Disarmament Intern.

Revised August 10, 2012.

Update (5/18/2012): This amendment was passed by a vote of 238-162.

As the House debates and votes on the defense authorization bill Reps. Rehberg (MT) and Lummis (WY) will offer and amendment that would add an unnecessary provision to the NDAA to undermine the U.S. ability to implement the 2010 New START Treaty. The amendment would impose a one-for-one reduction implementation process that is impractical and militarily unnecessary. FCNl joined with 28 other organizations and experts to send a letter to members of the House in opposition of the Rehberg Amendment. Read the letter below.

Oppose Rehberg #59 Amendment to Undermine New START Treaty

May 17, 2012

Dear Representative,

We are writing to urge you to oppose an amendment that would add yet another unnecessary provision to the NDAA to undermine the U.S. ability to implement the 2010 New START agreement. Other similar provisions in the bill (Secs. 1053-1059) have led the White House to issue a veto threat because they would “impinge on the President's ability to implement the New START Treaty and to set U.S. nuclear weapons policy.”

The amendment offered by Reps. Rehberg (MT) and Lummis (WY) would block U.S. implementation of New START unless the Russian Federation makes “a commensurate reduction, conversion, or decommissioning pursuant to the levels set forth under such treaty.” New START, which was approved by a bipartisan majority in the Senate, establishes common, verifiable limits on strategic deployed warheads (1,550 each) and deployed delivery vehicles (700 each) that must be met by 2018. At the United States insistence, New START allows each side to implement the treaty at its own pace and to structure its forces as it sees fit.

The amendment attempts to impose a one-for-one arms reduction implementation process that is impractical and militarily unnecessary. Further, the amendment attempts to protect the nuclear delivery systems in the districts of the authors from reductions into the indefinite future regardless of decisions about security needs and requirements that might be made by this or future administrations.

We strongly urge you to oppose the Rehberg #59 amendment. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Carol Blythe, PresidentAlliance of Baptists

Susan Gordon, DirectorAlliance for Nuclear Accountability

Terri S. Lodge, Director for Nuclear SecurityAmerican Security Project

Eric Sapp, Executive DirectorAmerican Values Network

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive DirectorArms Control Association

Ambassador Robert Grey, DirectorBipartisan Security Group

Katie Heald, CoordinatorCampaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

Melissa A. Kaplan, Msc, Deputy Director of Government RelationsCitizens for Global Solutions

Joni Arends, Executive Director Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Santa Fe, NM

T. Michael McNulty, SJ, Justice and Peace DirectorConference of Major Superiors of Men

John Isaacs, Executive DirectorCouncil for a Livable World

David Culp, Legislative RepresentativeFriends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Bobbie Paul, Executive DirectorGeorgia Women’s Action for New Direction

Dr. Paul F. Walker, Director of Security and SustainabilityGlobal Green USA

Rachelle Lyndaker Schlabach, DirectorMennonite Central Committee U.S. Washington Office

David Krieger, PresidentNuclear Age Peace Foundation

Jay Coghlan, Executive DirectorNuclear Watch New Mexico

Marie Dennis, Co- presidentPax Christi International

Kevin Martin, Executive Director Peace Action

Alicia Godsberg, Executive DirectorPeace Action New York State

Jon Rainwater, Executive DirectorPeace Action West

Jerry Stein, Coordinator of the BoardPeace Farm, Amarillo, TX

Catherine Thomasson, MD, Executive DirectorPhysicians for Social Responsibility

Joel Rubin, Director of Policy and Government AffairsPloughshares Fund

Marylia Kelley, Executive DirectorTri-Valley CAREs, Livermore, CA

Lisbeth Gronlund, Co-Director and Senior Scientist, Global Security ProgramUnion of Concerned Scientists

Rev. Michael Neuroth, Justice and Witness MinistriesUnited Church of Christ

James E. Winkler, General SecretaryUnited Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society

Susan Shaer, Executive DirectorWomen’s Action for New Directions

Update (5/18/2012): This amendment was rejected by a vote of 112-308.

As the House debates and votes on the defense authorization bill Reps. Markey (MA), Welch (VT) and Conyers (MI) have offered an amendment to delay the development of the new, long-range, nuclear-capable bomber by 10 years and delete $292 million in spending for FY 2013. Delaying the new bomber would save $18 billion over 10 years and still allow the Pentagon to deploy the same number of bombers as planned under New START. FCNL joined with 28 other organizations and experts to sen a letter to the House in support of the amendment. Read the letter below.

Support Markey-Welch-Conyers Nuclear Bomber Amendment to Save $18 Billion

May 17, 2012

Dear Representative,

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) increases spending for several wasteful nuclear weapons and missile defense programs. In a time of an ongoing budget crisis, Congress should not waste billions of dollars on programs that do not enhance national security. In order to help reduce spending in the NDAA to a sensible and sustainable level, we urge you to support the following key floor amendment.

SUPPORT. #11. Markey (MA); Welch (VT); Conyers (MI). New Nuclear-Capable Bomber.Would delay the development of the new, long-range, nuclear-capable bomber by 10 years and delete $292 million in spending for FY 2013. Delaying the new bomber would save $18 billion over 10 years and still allow the Pentagon to deploy the same number of bombers as planned under New START.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Carol Blythe, PresidentAlliance of Baptists

Terri S. Lodge, Director for Nuclear Security American Security Project

Eric Sapp, Executive Director American Values Network

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive DirectorArms Control Association

Ambassador Robert Grey, DirectorBipartisan Security Group

Katie Heald, Coordinator Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

William D. Hartung, Director, Arms and Security ProjectCenter for International Policy

Melissa Kaplan, Deputy Director of Government RelationsCitizens for Global Solutions

Bob Kinsey Colorado Coalition for Prevention of Nuclear War

David Culp, Legislative Representative Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Bobbie Paul, Executive Director Georgia Women's Action for New Direction

Dr. Paul F. Walker, Director of Security and Sustainability Global Green USA

Tom Carpenter, Executive Director Hanford Challenge, Seattle

David Krieger, PresidentNuclear Age Peace Foundation

Jay Coghlan, Executive DirectorNuclear Watch New Mexico

Glenn Carroll, Coordinator Nuclear Watch South, Atlanta

Marie Dennis, Co-President Pax Christi International

Kevin Martin, Executive DirectorPeace Action

Alicia Godsberg, Executive Director Peace Action New York State

Jon Rainwater, Executive Director Peace Action West

Jerry Stein, Coordinator of the BoardPeace Farm, Amarillo, TX

David Hart, Director of Security Programs Physicians for Social Responsibility

Joel Rubin, Director of Policy and Government Affairs Ploughshares Fund

Jean Stokan Sisters of Mercy of the Americas, Institute Justice Team

Liz Woodruff, Executive DirectorSnake River Alliance, Idaho

Marylia Kelley, Executive DirectorTri-Valley CAREs, Livermore, CA

Stephen Young, Senior Analyst, Global Security ProgramUnion of Concerned Scientists

James E. Winkler, General Secretary United Methodist Church, General Board of Church and Society

Susan Shaer, Executive Director Women's Action for New Directions

NOTE: Unfortunately, the amendments below were not approved for debate by the House Rules Committee. However, you can still call your representative and ask him or her to support the Markey, No. 11, amendment to delay the new nuclear bomber and to oppose the Rehberg, no. 59, amendment on the New START treaty. Delaying the new bomber would save $18 billion over 10 years and still allow the Pentagon to deploy the same number of bombers as planned under New START. The Rehberg amendment would impose a one-for-one reduction implementation process for New START that is impractical and militarily unnecessary. Call your representative today at 877-429-0678!

Dear Friend,

This week, the House will likely vote on funding for a new nuclear bomb plant in New Mexico and wasteful spending on a new missile defense site on the East Coast. Your representative is one of a select few who could help stop these proposals--but he or she needs to hear from you.

Please call your representative today toll-free at 877-429-0678 and ask him or her to vote "yes" on three amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act. When you call, ask to be connected to your representative's office (look up his or her name). Here are talking points to help you make your call.

• My name is ____ and I'm calling from (Your Town and State)
• I am asking Representative _____ to vote "yes" on three amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act: The Markey amendment to eliminate funding for a new bomb plant in New Mexico, the Sanchez amendment to reduce funding for nuclear weapons activities, and the Garamendi amendment to eliminate funding for a new missile defense site on the East Coast.
• Thank you.

These three amendments are likely to come up for a vote in the House this week.

1. No funding for a new bomb plant: We expect Rep. Ed Markey (MA) to offer an amendment to defund a new nuclear bomb plant in New Mexico. The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility would increase the U.S. capacity to produce nuclear weapons. The total cost for the CMRR is estimated at up to $5.8 billion.

2. Reduce funding for nuclear weapons activities: We expect Rep. Jared Polis (CO) to offer and amendment to return funding levels for nuclear weapons activities to the administration's request. Savings resulting from the amendment would be directed to deficit reduction.

3. No funding for East Coast missile defense site: We expect Rep. John Garamendi (CA) to offer an amendment to defund a new missile defense site on the East Coast. The planned site would cost up to $5 billion and uses technology that has failed multiples tests. Furthermore, Gen. Martin Dempsey, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on May 10 that the site is unnecessary.

The United States should be reducing its nuclear arsenal, not spending billions to increase capacity to build more bombs. The United States is not threatened by any country that is capable of striking the East Coast with an intercontinental ballistic missile. Please call 877-429-0678 and ask your representative to support eliminating funding for these projects in the defense authorization bill.

Thank you, and please spread the word by sharing this action alert with others. You can see other amendments that we are following on this legislation on our website.

Sincerely,

David Culp
Legislative Representative, Nuclear Disarmament

May 8, 2012

Dear Member of the Armed Services Committee,

The bill before you is among the most extreme defense authorization bills to ever be considered by the House Armed Services Committee.

It threatens to prevent U.S. military leaders from taking common sense steps to put America’s nuclear posture on a post-Cold War footing. It also adds billions of dollars in unneeded military spending.

While we do not know all of the amendments that will be offered, two amendments we urge you to support are:

Sanchez amendment to reduce by $323 million the nuclear weapons activities account of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

1. The amendment would reduce this account to the administration’s request.

2. This is the amount that both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have adopted for FY 2013—without dissent.

3. The increased spending in the McKeon/Turner bill cannot be sustained under the Budget Control Act, which is why NNSA has stretched out several major projects.

Garamendi amendment to strike a provision that requires building a missile defense site on the East Coast.

1. The facility would cost billions of dollars.

2. Iran has no nuclear weapons today and has no land-based missiles capable of reaching the United States.

3. The Defense Department does not support this proposal.

4. The proposal has more to do with the 2012 elections than it does national security.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
Arms Control Association

Katie Heald, Coordinator
Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

William D. Hartung, Director, Arms and Security Project
Center for International Policy

John Isaacs, Executive Director
Council for a Livable World

David Culp, Legislative Representative
Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers)

Dr. Paul F. Walker, Director of Security and Sustainability
Global Green USA

Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director
Natural Resources Defense Council

Jay Coghlan, Executive Director
Nuclear Watch New Mexico

Kevin Martin, Executive Director
Peace Action

Jon Rainwater, Executive Director
Peace Action West

Catherine Thomasson, MD, Executive Director
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Don Hancock, Nuclear Program Director
Southwest Research and Information Center, Albuquerque, NM

Marylia Kelley, Executive Director
Tri-Valley CAREs, Livermore, CA

Lisbeth Gronlund, Senior Scientist and Co-Director, Global Security Program
Union of Concerned Scientists

Catherine M. Kelleher, College Park Professor
University of Maryland