Addressing the Threat of Biological Weapons
The deliberate mailing last fall of virulent anthrax spores to two senators and several news organizations vividly illustrated the potential threat of biological weapons. Although evidence points to a U.S. laboratory (rather than a foreign biological weapons program) as the source of the spores, the incidents have raised the question of how best to prevent biowarfare.
Recent history of bioweapons control efforts
Beginning in the 1940s, the U.S., USSR, and UK all maintained robust bioweapons programs and continued to do so through the end of the 1960s. However, in 1966, the UN passed a resolution urging international compliance with a 1925 Geneva Protocol that banned bacterial warfare. Within a few years, the U.S., USSR, and UK had all taken steps to restrict their bioweapons programs.
An international Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was negotiated in the early 1970s. In 1974, at the request of Pres. Nixon, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty. The treaty entered into force in 1975, but without an agreed-upon means to verify compliance.
While the BWC significantly reduced global bioweapons technology, it did not eliminate it. Several nations refused to sign the treaty; others signed but continued to produce bioweapons. Many signatory nations have, at various times, been suspected of maintaining secret bioweapons facilities or of trying to obtain materials that could lead to the development of such weapons.
In 1994, after evidence of treaty violations by Iraq and the former Soviet Union, parties to the treaty met to discuss creation of legally binding verification measures. Over the next six years, negotiators worked to resolve disagreements over compliance measures, the cooperative exchange of biotechnology and materials, and export controls. Negotiators from the Clinton administration were actively engaged in the process.
U.S. scuttles international efforts
In 2001, with the change in administration, U.S. policy shifted. During the summer, negotiators meeting to prepare for the fifth review of the BWC failed to reach an agreement on procedures that might allow for verification and monitoring of biological weapons technology. The position of the U.S. delegation was the main stumbling block.
The U.S. raised two principal objections. First, the proposed protocols would not adequately protect U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies from having to divulge information that might compromise a company’s economic edge in a highly competitive environment. Second, the proposed protocols were dangerously inadequate in dealing with so-called rogue nations.
When the review conference occurred (Nov. 19 - Dec. 7, 2001), the U.S. delegation offered a last-minute alternative proposal to the generally agreed upon draft protocol. Other negotiators saw this as a blatant attempt by the U.S. to derail the conference and deeply resented the uncompromising stance of the U.S. in rejecting a protocol that represented years of work.
What lies ahead?
Reducing the threat of biological weapons must be addressed through international agreements rather than through the efforts of individual nations to build strong bioweapons programs. In this respect, bioweapons control strongly resembles nuclear weapons control. The next opportunity for review of the draft protocol will be November 2002. The U.S. should join the international community in developing legally binding verification measures and thereby slow the spread of biological weapons.
