National Missile Defense: Taking Aim at the Wrong Target

What is more important to world security: diplomacy and arms control or weapons? The answer, according to many in Congress and the administration, is weapons. The U.S. government even pours billions of dollars into a fatally-flawed system like National Missile Defense (NMD).

What is the National Missile Defense system?

The NMD system is the latest version of the Reagan “Star Wars” program. NMD is a ground-based system of missiles designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles as they reenter the atmosphere above the United States. The goal of NMD is to protect parts of the continental U.S. from a limited (5-20) missile attack.

NMD has also become a weapon in the political arsenal. Last spring, Congress voted to make it U.S. policy to deploy an NMD system as soon as it was technologically possible. The measure secured the support of both friends and foes of NMD. NMD- friends saw this as an important step toward implementing NMD. NMD-foes, worried about election-year fall-out if they opposed NMD, felt that this measure was safe to support because they believe that NMD will never meet the threshold of being “technologically possible.”

Pres. Clinton has also pursued this convoluted political strategy. His apparent support of NMD robs Republicans of this issue for the elections. But, by setting unattainable criteria for deployment of NMD, the President can satisfy some Democratic opponents of NMD.

The President has set four criteria for deployment. These are 1) the presence of a threat, 2) the cost of NMD and its effect on other military programs, 3) the impact of NMD on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions, and 4) technological success of the system. The President is scheduled to decide, perhaps as early as June 2000, whether to deploy NMD by beginning construction of the first sites for NMD vehicles.

Can NMD meet the criteria?

How much will NMD cost? Although Pres. Clinton has requested $13 billion for NMD, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the NMD system will cost $31-$60 billion to build and deploy. An additional $2-$4 billion a year will be required for maintenance and operation.

How might NMD impact on U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions? The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty between the U.S. and Russia restricts the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. NMD would violate this treaty, unless Russia agreed to renegotiate it.

NMD, by giving the U.S. an apparent edge in responding to a missile attack, would likely diminish Russian willingness to continue reducing their nuclear stockpile. NMD could also prompt China to increase its nuclear threat.

Deployment of NMD, coming on the heels of the Senate defeat of the CTBT, would send a signal to other countries that the U.S. would rather rely on the Cold War strategy of “peace through strength” than reduce threats through arms control. Such a U.S. strategy would perpetuate a nuclear weapons race the U.S. can “win” only at the price of a new and more fragile “balance of terror.”

Can NMD work? To date, NMD systems have failed the easiest, most highly controlled tests. Officials have scheduled only three tests for the current system prior to Pres. Clinton’s deployment decision. The first test, last fall, was considered a success, although this “success” resulted from a malfunction. The second test (Jan. 2000) was a failure. The third test is scheduled for April or May 2000. In real-life, NMD could be easily defeated by simple counter-measures.

NMD is not a magic bullet for national security

At best, NMD could only defend against a limited attack by one type of delivery vehicle (ballistic missiles). NMD cannot defend against weapons delivered by a truck, plane, suitcase, backpack, or ship. It cannot offer protection against a massive missile attack. The costs of NMD, both financial and in terms of international security, are enormous.

The U.S. should abandon NMD. Instead, the U.S. government should work to create real security. How can we do this?

The U.S. should

• take its nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert,


• immediately reduce nuclear stockpiles to START II levels,


• engage in active diplomacy (like that which convinced North Korea to abandon a weapons- grade plutonium facility),


• strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty,


• ratify and implement the CTBT, and


• strengthen groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which cooperates to impede the development and spread of ballistic missiles.

NMD, like arms proliferation, is rooted in the false premise that one can control one's enemy. FCNL urges negotiated worldwide disarmament, supported by both the conversion of military industries to peaceful production and political settlements under world law. We are convinced that the risks of such a course are far smaller than the risks involved in the current course of endless weapons development.