Foreign and Military Policies Proposed by U.S. Threaten U.S.-China Relations

Even as Congress considers approving PNTR, the U.S. government is considering other actions that could threaten U.S.-China relations.

U.S.-Taiwan Military Ties

In February, the House passed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (HR 1838) by a vote of 341-70. The bill would strengthen U.S.-Taiwan military ties through increased cooperation, training, and communications. The bill is now pending before the Senate. The Administration opposes the bill.

On a separate, but parallel track, the Administration announced plans this spring to sell the Taiwanese government a new long-range radar system and advanced missiles and to provide additional military aid to the Taiwanese government. Many in Congress want to provide much more, including naval destroyers and aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. Future U.S. military plans in the western Pacific include constructing theater missile defenses in Japan, South Korea, and, perhaps, Taiwan and elsewhere to encircle China.

HR 1838 and the pending weapons sales could provoke the leadership in Beijing at a time when the newly-elected government in Taiwan is seeking to ease tensions and promote dialog with the Mainland government. Congress should not undermine these delicate diplomatic efforts.

Passage of HR 1838 and the provision of military equipment and aid would give political energy to hardline and militaristic factions in the Chinese Communist Party who favor reunification by force with Taiwan. These are the same elements in the Chinese government who oppose the current economic reforms in China and who might welcome U.S. steps to isolate China from other nations.

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation

Many members of Congress are concerned that China has transferred nuclear weapons and missile technologies to other countries in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Sens. Thompson (TN) and Torricelli (NJ) have sought to address these concerns by introducing the China Non-Proliferation Act (S 2645). The bill would establish a series of unilateral penalties and sanctions against Chinese or foreign persons or business entities, or the government of China if they are found to be engaged in spreading weapons of mass destruction.

Sanctions against the Chinese government would include halting military-to-military contacts, cutting foreign assistance, suspending scientific, academic, and technical exchanges, and ending access to export and import financing guarantees and credits. Further, the bill would extend the reach of U.S. law to penalize foreign firms and persons in other countries that knowingly collaborate in weapons proliferation activities with the Chinese government or Chinese entities.

Companion legislation (HR 4829) has been introduced in the House by Reps. Gilman (NY) and Markey (MA).

Addressing the spread of weapons of mass destruction

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a serious concern. However, making new threats against the Chinese government at this time is not the best way to bring China into the community of nations in common cause against the proliferation of these weapons. The Chinese government is more likely to cooperate and observe international norms of behavior if it is recognized by other governments as an equal, responsible partner in the international community, than if it is isolated, preached at, and threatened.

The experience of the past two decades, since China began to engage increasingly with the outside world, gives evidence of this. During this time, China has come a long way toward joining in cooperative international efforts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking before a press conference in Beijing, July 8, Senior Advisor to the President for Arms Control and International Security, John D. Holum, observed

. . . that China has, in a very short time, covered an extremely long distance in terms of commitment to, and involvement in, arms control and non-proliferation regimes. Prior to 1992, China was not a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In earlier years than that, it had actively opposed these regimes. Now China is an active and constructive participant in a broad range of non-proliferation treaties and regimes. They joined the NPT in 1992; they joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1996, having been engaged in the negotiation. In 1996, they agreed not to transfer peaceful nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities anywhere. In 1997, they agreed to no nuclear cooperation with Iran. They negotiated with us—completed in 1996—a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They’ve played a constructive role in the missile issue with North Korea and in the nuclear issue. . . They’ve been very positive participants in the NPT review conferences, including the 1995 conference at which the treaty was made permanent. . .

Other countries contribute to global proliferation

China should not be singled out as the only country responsible for spreading missile technology. Other countries, including participating members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), have contributed to global proliferation, as well. Indeed, China would be justified in asking why it is being condemned for allegedly exporting missile technology to Pakistan while the U.S. is planning to sell missiles to Taiwan and to develop theater missile defense systems with other countries around China’s borders.

The MTCR is a voluntary agreement among 32 countries. It does not have the force of international law that a formal treaty has. It is enforced at the discretion of each member country through its own national laws. China is not a party to this agreement, but it has agreed to abide by some of its provisions. The current debate is over what the Chinese agreed to do and whether they kept their promise.

Holum characterized this debate as follows.

In 1994 China made a commitment that. . . actually goes beyond. . . the obligations that members of the Missile Technology Control Regime undertake. . . They committed not to provide MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles to any country. . .That, in our understanding, based on our information, is a commitment they have upheld. In addition to that, there is a dispute over the extent to which China agreed to limits on technology associated with the Missile Technology Control Regime. . . What is unclear, and is a matter of some dispute between us and them, is the extent to which that [i.e. the Chinese ban on exporting complete missile systems] reaches technology. And it is technology that is the area of concern. . .

Engaging China in arms control

In recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Bates Gill, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, recommended that, rather than threatening China with additional sanctions, the U.S. government should be seeking ways to draw China further into existing arms control regimes, building multilateral support “to curb Chinese activities of concern,” and offering positive incentives to China to exercise greater restraint. If this approach fails, he observes, the President has authority under current law to impose sanctions against countries that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Consistent with this approach, the Administration has been encouraging the Chinese government to take steps to qualify for membership in the MTCR. China is, according to reports, actively considering this. Further, through high-level diplomacy, the U.S. and Chinese governments have been engaged in addressing specific concerns about the transfer of missile technologies. The U.S. should continue these diplomatic efforts. At this time, smart diplomacy offers greater promise to influence Chinese government policy than does the flat-footed threat of sanctions.

S 2645 may be offered as an amendment to HR 4444, the PNTR bill, when it is debated in early September.