U.S. to Play Key Role in NPT Conference

The success of the May 2005 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will hinge on whether the Bush administration decides to work with the international community to strengthen the treaty. It appears the answer from Washington is “No.”

The NPT commits non-nuclear weapons states to forswear the development of nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear power technologies. The treaty also commits nuclear weapons states to eventual disarmament. At the review conference in New York this spring, representatives from more than 180 governments will measure their compliance against their NPT commitments. Governments will also have the opportunity to strengthen the treaty.

The U.S. is likely to push for tougher measures to constrain non-nuclear countries which receive nuclear technology for peaceful uses. Yet the U.S. is unwilling to fulfill its obligations under NPT to move towards eliminating its own nuclear weapons.

U.S. Actions Seen as Foot-dragging

The Bush administration has advocated research into new nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear “bunker buster,” despite Congress’ decision to cut the money for this program last year. Many other countries see this U.S. drive to develop new nuclear weapons as a violation of the U.S. obligation “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to...nuclear disarmament” (NPT, Article VI).

The United States should not allow its reluctance to adhere to its own NPT disarmament commitments to impede on strengthening the treaty. The need for stronger measures is underscored by a United Nations high-level panel report released last November stating: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

To reverse this erosion, more should be done to control nuclear technology and materials, and the International Atomic Energy Agency should have greater authority to monitor NPT compliance.

With respect to Iran and North Korea, U.S. compliance with the NPT and non-military diplomatic initiatives are needed to halt those countries' weapons programs.

Stronger NPT through U.S. Compliance

At the last NPT review conference in 2000, the United States agreed to 13 steps to demonstrate its commitment to nuclear disarmament called for in Article VI. So far, it has only complied with one of these steps. The U.S. should uphold its obligations by taking its nuclear weapons off of hair-trigger alert, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and supporting a verifiable treaty to ban the production of nuclear bomb materials.

Some observers claim that the U.S. is complying with its obligation to disarm, since it is committed to reducing its deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 2,200 by the year 2012 under the Moscow Treaty. But the U.S.-Russian treaty does not cover thousands of U.S. tactical weapons and “spare” nuclear weapons in storage. Nor does it require complete destruction of the warheads or delivery vehicles, meaning the U.S. could re-deploy these weapons when the treaty expires in 2012.

To meet its NPT obligation, the United States should go beyond the Moscow Treaty and begin reductions of its nuclear stockpile that are transparent, verifiable, and irreversible. Also, the U.S. should end research on new nuclear weapons.