Somalia: Any Chance for Peace?

Jul 27, 2009

(FCNL Policy Brief)

Somalia: Any Chance For Peace?

Author: Trevor Keck (July 2009)

Executive Summary

Somalia is home to the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Nearly half of the population, about 3.2 million people, is in need of emergency food aid, and ongoing violent conflict significantly impedes the efforts of aid agencies to reach those in need.

A peace deal signed in October 2008 offers the best hope in years for peace in Somalia but will require significant support from the international community. The recent escalation of violence underlines the fragility of the situation, the need for prudent diplomatic engagement, and sustained assistance for humanitarian relief, peacebuilding and security sector reform.

The US should avoid military approaches and focus policy toward Somalia around several goals: reinvigorating the peace process; supporting civil society and a capable and accountable Somali government; and turning the tide on the humanitarian crisis.

Key Policy Recommendations:

• The US should increase diplomatic resources by appointing an Ambassador for Somali Affairs and more dedicated staff to the Nairobi embassy. US diplomats should work with key African and Arab states to reinvigorate the peace process.


• The US should expand assistance to help the new government build legitimacy through projects that restore basic services, generate employment, and repair key infrastructure. The US should also increase support for civil-society led peacebuilding initiatives.


• Congress should fully meet President Obama's fiscal year 2010 budget request for Somalia of nearly $35 million for poverty alleviation and stabilization initiatives, and $200 million for peacekeeping.


• The U.S. should address humanitarian needs by expanding aid for displaced persons and refugees, urging Kenya to provide land for an expansion of the UN Dadaab refugee camp, and supporting UN-led demining efforts.


• President Obama should not order air strikes in Somalia, which in the past have fueled the insurgency. The US should also press Ethiopia and Eritrea to cease destabilizing involvement in Somalia.

The Current Peace Process and Political Developments

In October 2008, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) signed the Djibouti agreement and created a new Somali Government of National Unity (GNU), often referred to as the new TFG. The agreement between the internationally backed but domestically unpopular TFG and a coalition of moderate Islamists (the ARS) was the first of a series of political blows to Al-Shabaab, the main insurgent group in Somalia.

While numerous militant groups aligned with the new Somali coalition government, other factions rejected the Djibouti peace process altogether. Some militia clans simply did not see any incentive to join the new government, given that factions opposed to the peace process still held the majority of territory in south central Somalia. Groups such as Al-Shabaab and an ARS faction opposed making peace on ideological grounds. Core leaders of these militant groups reportedly seek to overthrow the government, eject all foreign forces, and impose a strict version of Islamic, or Sharia, law in Somalia.

In December 2008, Somalia's unpopular president —Ahmed Yusuf— resigned. The Somali parliament elected a moderate Islamist —Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed— to the presidency. This increased the popularity of the new TFG and undermined support for the Islamist insurgency. The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, which had invaded and occupied the country with U.S. support in 2006, further undercut the insurgency by removing a rallying cause for the group.

More recently, the Somali parliament voted to impose Sharia law throughout Somalia, further weakening the Islamist opposition.¹ Since the departure of Ethiopian troops, the insurgency evoked the new government's failure to follow Sharia law as its major rallying cry. While the international community may be wary of an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa, a vast difference exists between the Somali government's interpretation of Islam and the brand of Islam espoused by radical groups such as Al-Shabaab.

Despite Peace Deal, Fighting Persists

While more than 70,000 Somalis returned to Mogadishu between January and April 2009 due to improved security conditions, more than half of these returnees fled again due to a significant escalation of violence in and around the capital.² Given that opposition groups were not effectively engaged by the Somali coalition government or their international backers following the Djibouti peace agreement, the resumption of fighting is not surprising. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, another opposition group, joined forces and launched a new military offensive with hopes of toppling the new TFG government. Somali security forces retaliated with a major counteroffensive. Other pro-government militias have since picked up arms to fight the insurgency, including the traditionally non-violent Sufi clerics, testifying to the broad resentment of the tactics employed by insurgent groups.³

Unfortunately, Somali security forces have resorted to heavy-handed tactics, such as indiscriminate shelling of civilian populated areas, a tactic that eroded the support of the former Somali government. At the time of writing, more than 200,000 Somalis have fled Mogadishu, according to the UN refugee agency.⁴ More are likely to flee before the fighting stops. Many of these refugees have fled to the UN administered Dadaab refugee camp in neighboring Kenya, which is struggling to deal with the new arrivals. While the camp was originally constructed for just 90,000 people, Dadaab now hosts more than 300,000 refugees.

While the latest round of fighting resembles a civil war, in fact, outside forces are also fueling the violence. More than 400 foreign fighters traveling from the Middle East, South Asia, Europe and the United States have joined the insurgency, according to Ted Dagne a researcher with the Congressional Research Service.⁵ While intelligence suggests that foreigners associated with Al-Qaeda are welcomed by elements of Al-Shabaab, other militant factions, such as a group led by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys (a splinter faction of the ARS) have refused to associate with Bin Laden.⁶ Some of these groups have received military assistance from Eritrea.⁷ Lastly, Ethiopian troops, which are reportedly deployed on Somalia's western border, could return to Somalia should the Somali government collapse.

In July 2009, reports surfaced that African Union (AU) peacekeepers (AMISOM) were engaged in combat operations alongside Somali security forces.⁸ If true, the AU mission violated its narrow mandate of protecting key Somali government institutions, securing access for humanitarian aid, and training Somali military and police forces. AMISOM's force commander rebutted the charge, however, claiming that AMISOM acted within its mandate. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a bloc of six East African countries including Somalia, has called on the AU to change the mission's mandate and allow the AU peacekeepers to engage in combat operations against insurgent groups.⁹

Expanding AMISOM's involvement by allowing AU forces to fight along side Somali government forces risks emboldening the insurgency and embroiling the beleaguered 4,300 AU peacekeepers in a deadly war. With a moderate Islamic government, and the end of the Ethiopian occupation, the presence of "foreign peacekeepers" has become the last rallying cry for the insurgency. AU leaders should not expand AMISOM's role to war fighting, and should instead press the mission force commander to ensure peacekeepers act within their mandate.

The Somali Government's Challenges

The new TFG government faces two immediate challenges: containing the insurgency and demonstrating its own legitimacy by improving the security and livelihoods of the Somali people. To contain and reduce the threat of militant groups, the Somali government and its international backers must better respond to the motivations that drive people to join the insurgency. While some fighters may truly believe in the extremist version of Islam espoused by the most radical groups, many take up arms for economic reasons or to increase their political standing.¹⁰ Policies and resources focused on alternative economic opportunities could help draw fighters away from the insurgency and other criminal activities, such as piracy.

Improving economic security will not be easy given that most government ministries operate with little more than one minister and a laptop. Despite a lack of capacity, however, the new government has demonstrated a commitment to governing. In spring 2009, the Somali parliament passed a three-month budget for the government, something the previous parliament could not accomplish in a year. While two-thirds of the budget came from the international community, the government was able to briefly finance its security forces through taxes on goods brought in at the Mogadishu port.

Recent aid pledges to Somalia by the international community will support AMISOM and help the new TFG develop a 16,000 strong national security and police force. In providing funds, however, the international community should maintain pressure on the new TFG and the United Nations Development Program to develop sufficient oversight and vetting mechanisms to end impunity and keep security forces focused on their most important mission – public security.

Achieving Long-Term Stability

Robust support for civil society is critical to long-term stability in Somalia. Whether providing humanitarian or development aid, however, the international community should work through pre-existing clan, business and civil society structures, which are strong. The Somali diaspora also remains heavily engaged in Somali affairs and needs to be constructively engaged in the peace process.¹¹

The international community should consider financing a national community development program, similar to Afghanistan's National Solidarity Program.¹² Such a program could channel funds through the new TFG government directly to local communities, which would: enable communities to tailor aid to local needs; consolidate support for the Somali government among civil society; and, provide economic alternatives to joining the insurgency. While engaging in development efforts in southern Somalia may be more difficult due to ongoing fighting, central Somalia (ie. Galguduud and Mudug regions), which is less violent and not controlled by insurgent groups, would be a more conducive environment to begin such a program.

Somali civil society has also demonstrated its own ability to lead and implement conflict resolution initiatives. Last year, the business community, rights activists, and religious leaders convened the Ethiopian forces, TFG government representatives and insurgent leaders to address a major problem – raids, looting and fighting in Mogadishu's Bakhara market. The business community and civil society leaders secured an agreement to de-militarize the market and establish a private security force—funded by the business community and supported by the TFG government—to protect the market.¹³

For more than six months, the Bakhara market was one of the more peaceful areas in Mogadishu. While the recent insurgent offensive has undermined security in the market again, this example demonstrates the strength of Somali civil society in crafting local peace and security initiatives. Strengthening the government's security capacity will help provide a modicum of order, however, the international community should focus significantly more attention on supporting civil society peacebuilding initiatives.

Unexploded Ordnances

Landmines and other unexploded ordnances significantly impede humanitarian and recovery efforts in Somalia. While violent conflict makes it difficult to fully assess the problem, the U.N. estimates that between one and two million mines have been laid in Somalia. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) operates programs to remove unexploded ordnances in Puntland and Somaliland.

The U.N. Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is overseen by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, runs a small, but crucial program to remove mines and expand awareness of the risks posed by these ordnances in south central Somalia. In 2007, surveys performed by UNMAS in two key parts of the South – the Bay and Bakol regions – found that mines affected 66 villages, 12% of villages surveyed.¹⁴ Eyewitness reports suggest that Mogadishu is highly contaminated by unexploded ordnances. Removing these ordnances is critical to improving the security of civilians, enhancing humanitarian access, and protecting livestock.

The Question of a U.N. Peacekeeping Operation

Contingency plans are being prepared for a proposed U.N. peacekeeping force. In a recent report to the Security Council, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki Moon wisely recommended against deploying a large multi-dimensional U.N. force to Somalia at this time, noting that a large foreign force could quickly become a party to the conflict and weaken the legitimacy of the Somali government. Additionally, not one U.N. member state has offered troops, which underscores both the danger of such a mission and the likelihood of mission failure in the current volatile context.¹⁵

The Secretary-General recommended waiting for ripe conditions to deploy a U.N. force. He urged a phased approach, beginning with reinforced support for AMISOM and expanded assistance for Somali security forces. As security permits, U.N. staff intend to travel to Mogadishu to assess the conditions for re-locating the U.N. political office for Somalia from Nairobi to Mogadishu to oversee aid and support AMISOM. After these steps, the Security Council would then determine whether to authorize a larger U.N. force to take over from the African Union.

Piracy: Focus on the Crisis on Land

Piracy results from insecurity on land and grievances over illegal fishing and dumping in Somalia's waters. Since the early 1990's, foreign fishing vessels have looted Somalia's waters, which are teeming with exotic fish. In 2005, U.N. Environment Program researchers reported that nuclear waste dumped on Somalia's coasts by European firms was infecting Somalis in coastal areas.¹⁶ Disgruntled fisherman first took up arms and loaded into skiffs to defend their waters. A criminal enterprise soon developed after others learned of the exorbitant ransom payments these fishermen were able to exact.

To counter piracy, the international community has sent more than two-dozen ships to protect shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden. Yet, piracy has flourished. Ending the threat of piracy will require a capable Somali government. In the near term, the international community should coordinate asset freezes on piracy sponsors, direct the Gulf of Aden based armada to seize ships that are illegally fishing and dumping, and revise piracy laws to deal with situations where governments are unable to police their own waters.

US Policy Recommendations

In crafting a Somalia policy, the Obama Administration should adopt several goals: supporting an accountable and capable Somali government; reinvigorating the peace process; stemming the humanitarian crisis; and helping consolidate the peace in less violent areas through focused stabilization assistance.

Strengthen Diplomatic Outreach, Halt Military Escalation

• The US should work with and through key African and Arab states to reinvigorate the peace process. While some insurgent groups remain ideologically driven, a concerted diplomatic effort by the Somali government – backed by aid and other concessions from the international community – could provide incentives for more opposition groups to join the peace process. The US should:


• Appoint a seasoned diplomat to be Ambassador for Somali Affairs. While the Ambassador should tread carefully, working behind the scenes to support the Somali government and peace process, assigning an ambassador to the post would signal a new approach to this war-wracked country – one led by the State Department rather than the Pentagon. The Ambassador should work out of the Nairobi embassy and be empowered with a pool of discretionary funds to provide rapid assistance for Somali civil society-led projects or focused government reconstruction initiatives.
  
  The Ambassador should work in concert with the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General to support the Somali government in reaching out to key Arab states with ties to insurgent groups, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, and create incentives for insurgent groups to commit to a cease-fire. The Ambassador should also press AMISOM and Somali government leadership to hold security forces accountable to human rights standards, including internationally recognized laws of war.


• Increase staff working on Somalia at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi. At the least, the embassy should receive a political officer, diplomatic security detail (to support logistics and safety for staff travel), and a foreign-service national to work with the Somali business community on trade and development issues.
• President Obama should not order any air strikes on Al-Shabaab or other insurgent groups. U.S. military escalation of the conflict will only fuel the insurgency. Past U.S. interventions in Somalia, including military strikes, counterterrorism activities, and support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, have undermined the search for peace and contributed to the current crisis.


• The US should also continue to press Ethiopia and Eritrea to cease destabilizing involvement in Somalia. Ethiopia's past military intervention and Eritrea's continuing efforts to finance the insurgency have undermined stability.

Expand Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Accountability Efforts

• The US should expand development aid to strengthen civil society and consolidate the peace in less violent areas, as well as help the new government build legitimacy through projects which restore services, generate employment, and repair key infrastructure. An internationally supported effort modeled on Afghanistan's successful National Solidarity Program offers one possibility.


• In the short term, Congress should fully meet President Obama's fiscal year 2010 budget request for Somalia, which would provide nearly $35 million for poverty alleviation, stabilization initiatives, and direct support to the Somali government, and another $200 million for peacekeeping.


• Assistance to AMISOM and Somali government forces should be conditioned on strict human rights standards. The US should not continue supporting these security forces should they engage in heavy handed tactics in combat operations.

Address the Humanitarian Crisis

• The Obama Administration should urge the Kenyan government to provide land to open up a fourth site at the U.N. administered Dadaab refugee camp in north eastern Kenya. While the Dadaab camp was created to house just 90,000 people, the camp now hosts as many as 300,000 refugees, nearly all of whom came from Somalia. The US should also increase humanitarian aid for the U.N.'s Dadaab operations and encourage other rich nations to step up aid as well.


• Congress should apportion a modest $1.7 million for the U.S. Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism and De-mining account (NADR) to the U.N. Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action. These funds would enable the U.N Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to perform mine risk education and removal initiatives in critical regions in southern Somalia.

Conclusion

While Somalia's search for peace will be long and challenging, following through on these modest recommendations would reduce support for the insurgency, shore up the new Somali government while ensuring accountability, and better support peacebuilding, long-term reconciliation, and stability.

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¹Kilner, Derek. "Somalia Parliament Endorses Islamic Law,” VOA News. 18 Apr. 2009.
²"UN Envoy hopes displaced return to Mogadishu,” 22 May 2009. UN Radio.
³Gettleman, Jeffrey. "For Somalia, Chaos Breeds Religious War,” New York Times. May 23, 2009.
⁴"Number of Mogadishu civilians displaced by fighting since early May tops 200,000,” UNHCR. July 7 2009.
⁵See "Somalia: The Crisis and Prospects for Lasting Peace,” testimony of Ted Dagne before the House Foreign Affairs Africa Subcommittee. 26 June 2009.
⁶"Somalis reject Bin Laden threats,” BBC News. Mar. 20, 2009.
⁷Clottey, Peter. "Somalia Has Proof of Eritrea's Meddling in Internal Affairs, Says Minister,” Voice of America. May 5, 2009.
⁸Clottey Peter. "AMISOM Denies Backing Somali Government Forces Fighting Insurgents,” Voice of America. July 13, 2009.
⁹Ashine, Argaw. "Somalia: IGAD Wants Peacekeepers to Engage in Combat,” Daily Nation. July 12, 2009.
¹⁰See "Somalia: Understanding Al – Shabaab,” 3 June 2009, Institute for Security Studies.
¹¹See "A Call to Jihad, Answered in America,” 11 July 2009, New York Times.
¹²A former Somali legislator proposed this idea.
¹³See Jama, Mohamed Ahmed. "Community policing in Mogadishu: a case study of Bakhara Market,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine. October 2008.
¹⁴FCNL interview, U.N. personnel.
¹⁵See "Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1863 (2009),” United Nations Security Council, April 16, 2009.
¹⁶See "UN: Nuclear Waste Being Released on Somalia's Shores After Tsunami,” PDF Version