Response to Peacebuilding Discussion Paper

Apr 28, 2010

Below please find FCNL's response to a discussion paper released by the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee.

FCNL Response to the HCFA-SFRC Majority Discussion Paper on Peacebuilding

April 23, 2010

The Friends Committee on National Legislation commends staff of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees for their Discussion Paper on Peacebuilding (4/8/10). The Discussion Paper strives to meet a critical and under-addressed need of improving U.S. civilian structures and capacities to help prevent and resolve deadly conflict, and it offers innovative and constructive proposals that FCNL overall supports. We would like to offer some recommendations which we believe would improve the proposal and better meet the stated goal of a “unified civilian structure.” We look forward to further discussion and collaboration with congressional staff to refine and advance the paper’s proposals.

1. Language and Goal: We suggest adjusting the language of the overall Goal and proposals throughout the paper to emphasize that the role of the U.S. is to “assist in preventing and resolving violent [or deadly] conflict.” FCNL believes U.S. peacebuilding structures and capacities (including foreign assistance) should focus as much as possible on cooperating with the international community to help empower and build the capacity of local actors to prevent, resolve, and rebuild after violent conflict. While the paper acknowledges in a number of places the role of local actors and international institutions, a shift in overall language to emphasize a greater partnering role for the U.S. would strengthen it. Distinguishing between “conflict” and “violent conflict” as much as possible is also important as conflict itself is a natural process in human relations and, if managed appropriately and without violence, can lead toward greater justice and positive social change. A clearer definition of “peacebuilding” is needed to set practical boundaries for policy, structures, and operations.

2. Joint State-USAID Bureau: We believe the proposed State-USAID Council offers an innovative and important next step toward greater cohesion and improved civilian capacities. However, it does not meet the stated goal of a “unified civilian structure”. A truly unified action structure would be an integrated State-USAID bureau that brings all the most relevant offices and programs from each agency together into one operation, with dual reporting by the Director to both Secretary of State and USAID Administrator, and with dual State and USAID Deputy Director posts. The two Deputy Director posts could be filled by “dual-hatting” senior deputies from other relevant State and USAID functional or regional bureaus in each agency to create greater mainstreaming and reach back through the agencies. (Decision-making processes on priorities and funding would need to be developed that would mitigate against these Deputies favoring their own bureaus). Staff make-up of the bureau might be mandated at specific minimum (perhaps 30%) and maximum (perhaps 40%) levels for both State and USAID to ensure a balance of diplomatic and development expertise, as well as room for hiring from other agencies and outside experts. While we realize there may be practical and political challenges to creating such a new structure, we believe this bolder model offers the best hope for truly elevating peacebuilding and prevention, coordinating diplomatic and development functions, and building a unified purpose and approach.

3. Civilian Control and Role of DoD: FCNL believes the paper should more fully address the critical issue of civilian control over U.S. policy, planning, programming, and funding for peacebuilding and prevention. We recommend explicitly defining the work of U.S. support for peacebuilding and prevention activities as a civilian led-role and minimizing the role of DoD in providing assistance or undertaking activities related to prevention and peacebuilding. Any DoD activities identified as “conflict prevention” or “peacebuilding” or related to “phase 0 operations” should be undertaken only as part of a civilian-guided comprehensive U.S. strategy and with sign-off of the Director of the new bureau. Military authorities and funding for engaging in development activities should be revoked as such assistance has proven ineffective at achieving either national security or development goals, and often undermines peacebuilding and endangers civilians.

4. Funding: We welcome and strongly support the proposal of establishing a new Complex Crisis, Stabilization, and Prevention Fund and of specifying a portion of that fund be dedicated to prevention activities. FCNL suggests that 25-50% of the Complex Crisis, Stabilization, and Prevention Fund be specifically dedicated to prevention activities. We recommend specifying that the whole fund is limited to civilian activities and that DoD will not have a decision-making role in allocating funds. We also note the need for Congress to authorize and appropriate additional funding to support a strengthened joint State-USAID structure from the outset if this effort is to be successful. S/CRS, the CRC, and other prevention and peacebuilding structures have suffered from chronic under-funding.

5. Conflict Assessments: FCNL strongly supports the recommendation of requiring regular conflict assessments and strategies, though we have some remaining questions of how these would link to policy, planning, and resource allocation processes. We were puzzled to find no mention of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) within the recommendations on conflict assessments. We recommend utilizing and building upon the progress and learning thus far that has developed through use of the ICAF as a base for developing conflict assessments and strategies. FCNL also welcomes the proposal that State and DoD would be required to consider the conflict assessments in any major arms sale and in military assistance decisions. We would urge that proposal be strengthened to include “all lethal military and police assistance,” and that the requirement also include consulting with the Council Director before such transfers are approved.

6. Training and Mainstreaming Expertise: We welcome the proposal for increased training for “certain Foreign Service Officers” in the State Department. However, we believe mainstreaming prevention and peacebuilding requires orienting all Foreign Service Officers at a basic level, and also requiring training for certain USAID officers as well. Training should also be provided (and required) for all staff serving in the joint State-USAID bureau. In addition to having staff from various agencies serve on the bureau, we recommend detailing staff from the new bureau to serve in other relevant departments or agencies for certain periods of time, as a way of cross-fertilizing learning and mainstreaming peacebuilding and prevention back into the agencies.

7. Civilian Response Corps: We believe the CRC should remain, at least initially, within the Council to ensure that it develops as a tool of both diplomacy and development. We would rather see a proposal that maintains the CRC in the Council but focuses its activities on prevention of violent conflict and fully delinks it from U.S. military operations. We suggest posting CRC members within embassies and USAID missions (at their request) for more substantive periods of time, creating a special contingent to support mediation and negotiation in peace processes (perhaps directly supporting special envoys at critical times), and focusing some resources and energy of the CRC on assisting with the proposed conflict assessments (as it already does with ICAFs). We also suggest better delineating and coordinating the roles and activities of the CRC, OTI, and CMM to maximize impact and reduce duplication. The structure, mandate, and overall operations of the CRC could be reexamined in the context of the proposal.

8. Missing Middle (Still Missing?): The paper identifies a critical gap in U.S. civilian peacebuilding capacities, which the authors rightly call the “missing middle”. We are unclear, though, how (or if) the proposed changes to structure and funding would fill that gap and suggest more specific elaboration on this.

9. Atrocities and Genocide Prevention: The paper does not address the specific challenge of preventing atrocities and genocide, or bring relevant U.S. government structures and capacities that already exist for this purpose, into its proposals. FCNL believes atrocities and genocide prevention capacities need to be integrated into an overall U.S. approach to peacebuilding and preventing deadly conflict. While we are intrigued by the proposal for a standing interagency mechanism for conflict prevention, we are uncertain of how or if it would relate to other interagency mechanisms on specific conflict countries and, more recently, on war crimes and genocide prevention. We recommend integrating, or at least clearly linking, other capacities and structures on genocide and atrocities prevention into the proposal

10. International Capacities: We welcome the recommendation on building international capacities, with particular attention to strengthening UN peacebuilding capacities and specifically the Peacebuilding Commission. We recommend expanding this proposal to include particular attention to interfacing with, learning from, and helping strengthen peacebuilding and prevention mechanisms that already exist within regional organizations, including the OSCD, OECD, OAS, ECOWAS, AU, and ASEAN.

11. Role of Civil Society: We encourage inclusion of an additional recommendation in the paper specifically on working with and building capacity of local civil society. Additional specific proposals on the role of civil society might include establishing an advisory civil society board to the Council and/or creating civil society liaison post(s) within the Council.

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