FCNL Questions for Congress on Civil-Military Relations

Mar 16, 2009

(1) Under the Bush Administration, the Department of Defense (DoD) was granted a number of new authorities and funds to provide reconstruction, civic, development, military and security assistance. “Filling the gap” left by under-resourced civilian agencies in Iraq and Afghanistan became the mantra for new train and equip authorities for Defense, the CERP funds, expanding the scope of the Combatant commanders Initiative Fund and other programs which expanded the DoD’s control of foreign assistance.

Just last month, the DoD issued directive 1404.10, which directs the Pentagon to begin organizing, training and equipping a “civilian expeditionary workforce” of Defense civilian volunteers to serve abroad in reconstruction, relief and combat support missions. I am concerned that while we are expanding the DoD’s authorities and funding to deal with the problem of chronically under-resourced agencies, we aren’t remedying the problems at U.S. civilian foreign policy agencies. In a tight fiscal environment, it may become more difficult to secure vital funding for civilian agencies if it appears that Defense can be the “one stop shop” for U.S. foreign engagement.

What kinds of institutional safeguards need to be put in or kept in place to assure that civilian foreign policy agencies will eventually assume control of foreign assistance programs and responsibilities that have migrated to Defense?

(2) In 2007, the DoD, Interaction and USIP published a set of guidelines for relations between U.S. armed forces and NGO’S in non-permissive environments. I have heard that a similar project to establish clear guidelines for relations between the military and NGO’s in permissive environments may be forthcoming.

What do you believe is the role of the military if any in providing foreign assistance in permissive or friendly environments where combat is not likely or ongoing?

(3) A number of high level reports have made recommendations on the future of the DoD’s new global train and equip program, also known as Section 1206 assistance. Initially this program started as a pilot program in the 2006 NDAA, and allowed Defense to spend $300 million to train and equip foreign military and security forces of its choosing. The assumption was that Defense would use this program to outfit coalition forces en route to Iraq and Afghanistan, or deal with domestic terrorism challenges.

However, DoD has used this authority beyond these original purposes. For instance, the DoD has used the authority to train and equip forces in West Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America. Many of the military or other security forces DoD is outfitting are not dealing with the challenges the program was created to address.

The recent report A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future, which Dr. Adams contributed to, takes the position that the 1206 train and equip program should become the Department of State’s responsibility, and be funded through the State and foreign operations bill. Defense would continue to remain the implementer of these security assistance programs. The CSIS led report (published last spring), Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance, recommended that Congress extend the 1206 authority for three to five years (rather than make it permanent and global as Defense requested last year), while eventually phasing out the authority.

It appears the Armed Services Committee headed the advice of the CSIS led report, as Congress extended the authority for three years, leaving it temporary and capping the amount DoD could spend at $400 million. What should be done in the next three years to ensure both that foreign military aid programs under DoD are eventually moved under State and address the original concerns which led to the creation of the 1206 program?

(4) On January 23rd, Gordon England issued DoD Directive 1404.10, which directed Defense to begin organizing, training and equipping a civilian expeditionary workforce composed of DoD volunteers to serve in combat support, relief and reconstruction missions abroad. According to the Department, the intent of the program is “to maximize the use of the civilian workforce to allow military personnel to be fully utilized for operational requirements.”

This program is not intended to be a part of the interagency civilian response corps and thus seems to duplicate the work of this corps and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which was authorized and funded by this subcommittee last year. Defense has said they need this civilian workforce to free up soldiers for combat and cannot wait for the civilian agencies to stand up their capabilities. Yet, according to S/CRS coordinator John Herbst, nearly 1,000 members of the active and standby response corps have been hired or are on standby, waiting for funds from the FY 09 Omnibus spending bill.

Are you aware of the DoD’s proposed new civilian expeditionary workforce? Are you concerned this type of Defense led initiative could undermine efforts to increase funding for the interagency civilian response corps or other efforts to increase USAID’s capabilities? Or do you think is a necessary step to fill an emergency need?

(5) In FY 06, the DoD and State began a joint security, reconstruction and stabilization assistance initiative, known as the “Section 1207” program. Since FY 06, this program has enabled the DoD to transfer up to $100 million to the State Department for security, reconstruction and stabilization activities. Last year, the Armed Services Committees’ increased the annual authorization levels to $200 million, and extended the program for three years.

While 1207 projects are said to enable a rapid response to emergencies and opportunities, evidence suggests otherwise. For instance, while proposals were submitted in February 2007 to provide assistance to support the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, the funding did not reach the Africa Bureau of the State Department until February 2008. Unfortunately, a year later, the security environment had changed dramatically in South-Central Somalia, and some of the assistance projects could not even be implemented. While a year is still quicker than many foreign assistance programs, it is too slow to enable the State Department to respond to emergencies or capitalize on new opportunities. For more info.

Funding these programs through the State Department’s budget would make money available far quicker. What needs to happen to enable the State Department to assume control of these reconstruction, stabilization and security assistance programs?